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Abstract
In this thesis, the risk assessment methodology is applied to evaluate the safety of level
crossings on the JR East network. The risk of a crossing accident is defined as the
product of the likelihood of the accident (or the accident rate per million trains) and
the expected consequences per accident. This definition of risk is extended to include
the perceptions associated with catastrophic consequences and the willingness-to-pay
values of the consequences and is referred to as the monetary collective risk Rm.
Rail traffic volume, road traffic volume, visibility of the crossing, road gradient,
crossing width and the level of safety are shown to influence the accident rate and the
collective risk Rm. The mean accident rate at all crossings is 0.74 per million trains,
at crossings equipped with barriers is 0.59, at crossings equipped with warning bells
is 1.25 and is 0.76 at pedestrian crossings. Crossings equipped with obstacle detectors
have a lower accident rate (0.12) than crossings without detectors (0.43). Crossings
with visibility less than 20 m have a 50% higher mean accident rate than crossings
with visibility greater than 20 m. At crossings with high rail traffic volume in urban
areas, the consequences of train delays and cancellations are an order of magnitude
higher than the consequences of fatalities and injuries.
The human factors of the road driver is found to be an important component
of crossing accidents. A model which defines a "risk parameter" to account for the
human factors and also includes specific crossing attributes is developed to predict
the accidents. Risk management techniques are applied to determine the efficacy of
various level crossing safety devices. Finally, a Risk Management Plan is developed
for JR East to determine efficient allocation of resources for level crossing safety.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Level crossing safety
This thesis analyzes level crossing accidents on JR East' using the techniques of prob-
abilistic risk assessment. Since its formation from Japan National Railways (JNR)
in 1987, a total of 927 accidents have occurred on the 7894 crossings present on the
system as of March, 1993. This research was done under the aegis of the cooperative
research effort between MIT and JR East in the area of risk assessment.
1.2 The JR East Risk Assessment Project
The collaborative research effort between JR East and MIT began in January 1992
when Mr.Makoto Shimamura of the Safety Research Laboratory of JR East came to
MIT to study at the Center for Advanced Engineering Studies. He became interested
in the applications of probabilistic risk assessment to the daily operations of JR East
and discussed the research agenda with the MIT faculty. This set the stage for the
cooperative effort.
1Throughout this thesis, JR East refers to East Japan Railway Company.
1.2.1 Projects in the area of risk assessment
The first year research in the area of risk assessment commenced in September, 1993.
It was very productive and yielded four working papers:
1. Risk Assessment on the Amtrak Train Crash of September, 1993
2. A Framework to Measure the Safety Performance of a Railway Company
3. Preliminary Analysis of Level Crossing Accidents
4. Estimating the Probability of Rare Events
The preliminary analysis of the level crossing accidents was done by Dr.Armann
Ing6lfsson [8]. This yielded some very interesting results. For instance, it; showed a
dramatic decrease in the number of accidents since 1987, indicating the success of the
JR East investment in level crossing safety.
The second year program in the area of risk assessment commenced in September,
1994 and identified new areas of research in addition to some continuing research top-
ics. The two continuing topics of research were: Level Crossing Accidents and Safety
Performance Index. Two new research areas which were identified were: Risks from
Natural Hazards and Human factors in Risk Assessment. We have been continuing
the research related to level crossing safety since September, 1994.
1.2.2 Level crossing safety on JR East
Since its inception from Japan National Railways (JNR) in 1987, JR East has given
top priority to the safety of its complex network. The Safety Research Laboratory,
established in April 1989, carries out research in a variety of topics related to rail-
road safety such as level crossing accidents, accidents due to natural hazards, human
factors, train control etc.
A team of JR East people work specifically in the area of level crossing safety in the
Safety Research Laboratory. They are researching the application of better quality
safety devices such as level crossing barriers and obstacle detectors at level crossings.
In addition, they determine potential crossings which can be upgraded to a higher
level of safety by installing safety devices at the crossing. The group is also devel-
oping computer models to simulate better visibility of the crossings. These models
incorporate bright markings on the road leading to the crossing, roughening roads
having downward gradient so that vehicles don't slip at the crossing and installing
overhanging signs at low visibility crossings.
The work of the level crossing group is backed by the other employees of JR East
who try to ensure the safety of the crossings. Rigorous training programs at train
control centers train drivers to respond to a variety of emergency situations at level
crossings. The train control center at Tabata hosts four simulators which simulate
different accident scenarios at level crossings and train personnel to respond instantly
to these emergencies.
The company also advertises in the media about the dangers of illegal crossing.
Posters put up in railway stations and trains talk about the installation of various
safety devices at level crossings.
1.3 Level crossing safety in the US
Level crossing safety is of critical concern in the United States, as almost half of the
rail related deaths result from level crossing accidents. In 1993 alone, these accidents
resulted in 517 fatalities and 1,677 injuries at public crossings. At present, there
are a total of 168,000 public level crossings. To reduce level crossing accidents, a
program called the Rail-Highway Crossing Program (or the section 130 program) was
established as part of the Highway Safety Act of 1973. This program provides federal
support to the states so that they can improve their public crossings and reduce
the number of accidents occurring at these crossings [21]. The different methods to
improve crossings are:
* Separate the crossings by building overbridges or underpasses.
* Install warning devices at the crossings.
* Close the crossings.
A number of organizations are involved in the effort to improve the safety of level
crossings. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Railroad Ad-
ministration (FRA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
are the three Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies which oversee the issue
of crossing safety at the federal level [21]. The FHWA implements the Rail-Highway
Crossing Program, the FRA is responsible for railroad safety and the NHTSA funds
education programs for road drivers about driving behavior. A private organization,
Operation Lifesaver, promotes level crossing safety by education and law-enforcement
efforts [21]. It is supported by federal and railroad funds and is a very strong operator
in trying to improve level crossing safety.
The number of crossing accidents has declined significantly since the Rail-Highway
Crossing Program began in 1974. But, most of the reduction has come about in. the
first ten years of the program (till 1985) and little decline has occurred after that.
During this period, the number of crossings also declined from 219,161 in 1975 to
168,116 in 1993 [21].
1.3.1 Estimating the safety of level crossings
Several researchers have worked on various methods to predict the safety of a level
crossing. In the United States, empirical formulae have been used to predict the ex-
pected accident rate at a level crossing. These formulas consider the accident history
as well as some of the causal factors in determining the accident rate at a particular
crossing. Most of the formulas determine the hazard index which can be used as a
basis to measure the number and severity of the accidents. A few of the formulas are
discussed below.
1. The Peabody and Dimmick Formula [18]: This formula predicts the expected
number of accidents in 5 years, A 5 as
1.28VoV1 70 + To0 151
As = +K (1.1)
po.171
where
V: Average 24 hour traffic volume
T: Average 24 hour train volume
Pc: Protection coefficient
K: Additional parameter
2. The New Hampshire Formula [6]: The hazard index, H.I, is given as
H.I = VTPf (1.2)
where
V: Average 24 hour traffic volume
T: Average 24 hour train volume
Pf: Protection factor
3. The Mississippi Formula [6]: The Hazard index, H.I, is given as
H.I = SDR/8 + A5H.I = (1.3)2
where
SDR: Sight distance rating
A5 : Expected number of accidents in 5 years
4. The Ohio method [6]: The hazard index, H.I, is given by
H.I = Af + Bf + Gf + Lf + Nf + SDR (1.4)
where
Af: Accident probability factor
Bf: Train speed factor
Gf: Approach gradient factor
Lf: Angle of crossing factor
Nf: Number of tracks factor
SDR: Sight distance rating
5. The DOT Accident Prediction Formula [6]: This formula combines both the
accident history for the crossing and the accident causal factors and defines the
accident prediction as
To NA=T x (a + ~ (1.5)To + T T
where
A: Final accident prediction in accidents per year at the crossing
a: Initial accident prediction, which is defined as
a = K x (El) x (MT) x (DT) x (HP) x (MS) x (HT) x (HL) (1.6)
where
K: Constant for initialization of factor values at 1.00
EI: Factor for exposure index based on the product of highway and train traffic
MT: Factor for number of main trains
DT: Factor for number of trains per day during daytime
HP: Factor for highway paved
MS: Factor for maximum timetable speed
HT: Factor for highway type
HL: Factor for number of highway lanes
N/T: Accident history prediction (N accidents in T years)
To: Formula weighting factor, given as
1.0
To = (1.7)0.05 + a
Of the five nationally recognized prediction formulas, namely the DOT formula,
Peabody-Dimmick, NCHRP Report 50, Coleman Stewart and the New Hampshire
formulas, the DOT accident prediction formula outperforms the others in terms of
predicting the number of accidents that have occurred at all crossings [5].
Thus, most of the accident prediction formulas consider some of the important at-
tributes of the level crossing in computing the hazard index. The DOT formula
considers both the accident history as well as the crossing attributes in determining
the accident prediction (number of accidents per year).
1.3.2 Strategies for improved level crossing safety
Many strategies can be employed to improve the safety of level crossings. They
range from engineering approaches like installing warning bells and crossing barriers
to enforcement and education efforts warning people about the dangers of illegal
crossing.
Engineering Approaches
The conventional approach used to improve the safety of crossings is to install warning
bells and level crossing barriers. The barrier comes down before the train reaches
the crossing, preventing any road vehicles from legally going into the crossing area.
In addition, crossings can be installed with obstacle detectors and alarm buttons.
Obstacle detectors detect the presence of any vehicles caught in the crossing and
activate the railroad signalling system (Section 3.2.1). Alarm buttons act; as an aid
to the detectors and can be activated in the event of an emergency. At low visibility
crossings, warning signs can be put up by the side of the road alerting the driver of
the presence of a crossing ahead.
Grade separation is a viable solution to prevent illegal crossings, but is much more
expensive than installing warning devices [21]. Hence, it is not used often.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) is funding the research on new technologies
to improve crossing safety [21]. Some of the technologies are discussed below:
1. The Friendly Mobile Barriers System [21]: This system consists of a barrier
that rises up from the road after the level crossing gates have come down.
Thus, it can prevent any vehicle from going into the crossing area. The barrier
is designed to absorb the energy of a vehicle striking it, thereby avoiding serious
injuries to the occupants of the vehicle.
2. The Illinois Dragnet Arresting System [21]: This system consists of a net which
can be lowered from roadside towers and acts as a barrier in addition to the
existing barriers at the crossing.
Neither of the systems have been tested in actual conditions, but it is believed that
they will be cheaper than grade separating the crossing and more expensive than
installing the warning system [21].
Education and enforcement
The existing engineering solutions to improve crossing safety have a limit to their
effectiveness, since they cannot prevent road vehicles from illegally driving into the
crossing. Strict enforcement by the authorities can help in reducing the number of
illegal crossings. But this by itself is not a solution. For instance, half the level crossing
accidents on the JR East network are due to illegal crossings (ignoring the warning
bell or intrusion against the level crossing gate) even though a fine of 10,000 yen is
levied on drivers who illegally go across. Enforcement coupled with active education
campaigns can effectively reduce the number of illegal crossings. Operation Lifesaver
has been doing a tremendous job in the US educating people about the consequences
of violating crossing warning signs.
Thus, engineering approaches, both conventional and innovative, along with effective
education and enforcement can reduce the number of crossing accidents.
1.4 Motivation
The impetus for our work lies in the concern that the Safety Research Laboratory of
JR East expressed regarding the issue of level crossing safety. They were interested
in the causal factors of accidents and the relative importance of the different cross-
ing attributes in determining the accident rate. Their other concern was identifying
crossings that need to be upgraded to a higher level of safety because of their likeli-
hood of having accidents.
The probabilistic risk assessment methodology is a tool which can be effectively uti-
lized to address their concerns. It addresses the risk of a level crossing accident as the
product of the likelihood of occurrence of an accident and the expected consequences
of that accident. The accident rate (or the likelihood) quantifies the importance of
the various level crossing attributes and determines whether they are significant. The
effectiveness of the various safety devices at the crossing can be determined by look-
ing at the risk values for crossings equipped with the different devices. The issue
of perceived risk can be addressed in the context of the likelihood of catastrophic
accidents. Finally, potential crossings which need to be upgraded can be identified
by the risk cost criterion.
1.5 Organization of the thesis
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 talks about the risk assessment methodology. We give the various defini-
tions of risk and present the three components of the risk assessment methodology,
namely risk analysis, risk appraisal and the optimal allocation of resources. Risk
analysis is the technical component of risk assessment and involves the application of
concepts from the fields of engineering and probability theory. Risk appraisal talks
about value judgments and discusses the perceptions of risk. Factors affecting the
perceptions of risk are evaluated and the definition of risk is extended to include these
perceptions. The way in which information about safety is transmitted to the public
is also discussed. Finally, the issue of the optimal allocation of resources is presented
in the context of the limited availability of resources for safety. The question that is
addressed is the following: How do we allocate the resources such that we can achieve
the greatest reduction in risk? The condition for the optimum investment level is also
presented.
In Chapter 3, we carry out the exploratory analysis of the level crossing and accident
databases. Specifically, we look at some of the important level crossing attributes
which affect the number of accidents at the crossing. The risk assessment methodol-
ogy is developed for the level crossing accidents on JR East by defining the accident
rate and the consequences of the accidents. The accident rates and the monetary
collective risk are determined for crossings equipped with the various safety devices
by type of road traffic involved in the accident. The efficacy of the safety devices in
reducing the risk of the accidents is also illustrated. Finally, a brief discussion on the
possibility of catastrophic level crossing accidents is presented.
In Chapter 4, we develop a risk model to predict the accidents occurring at the cross-
ing. This model is a behavioral model and considers the characteristics of the crossing
as well as the human factors involved in crossing accidents. We also come up with
order of magnitude estimates for the likelihood of a vehicle going into the crossing
area once the warning bell starts ringing and also when the barrier starts coming
down.
In Chapter 5, we illustrate the risk management of level crossings by performing a
cost-benefit analysis on the application of the various safety devices at the crossing.
Cost-benefit analyses are also conducted to upgrade the safety of low visibility cross-
ings and crossings with significant downward road gradient leading to the crossing.
Sensitivity analyses is done by varying the value of life estimates and determining its
effect on the efficacy of the safety devices. A Risk Management Plan for level crossing
safety is presented to JR, East.
Finally, the conclusions of the work is presented in Chapter 6 of the thesis.
Chapter 2
The Risk Assessment
Methodology
2.1 What is risk?
There are very many different definitions of risk. Rowe [11] defines risk as "the. po-
tential for unwanted negative consequences of an event or activity" and refers to the
notion of chance. Lowrance [11] explicitly accounts for the dichotomy in the defini-
tion of risk and refers to it as the "measure of probability and severity of adverse
effects." Gratt [11] takes a similar stance as Lowrance and specifies the relationship
between the probability and the adverse consequences by stating that the "estimation
of risk is usually based on the expected result of the conditional probability of' the
event times the consequences of the event given that it has occurred." Wharton [11]
states that "a risk is any unintended or unexpected outcome of a decision or course
of action," including both positive and negative outcomes. Odoni [17] defines risk as
"the average "cost" per unit of time due to the occurrence of unwanted events" and
refers to it as the product of the number of accidents per unit of time and the average
cost per accident. Thus, all of the above mentioned references to risk broadly define
it as the product of the probability of occurrence of an event and its consequences,
whether it be positive or negative.
Technological risk, which is a branch of man-made risk, has become an issue of con-
cern in recent years. This importance can be attributed to the large improvements in
science and technology. A noteworthy paradox is that while advances in technology
occurred as a way to mitigate the risks, these advances themselves have become an
issue of increasing risks to society. Nuclear spillage, industrial pollution, environmen-
tal degradation and radiation hazards are some types of technological risks. One of
the reasons as to why technological risks are greatly feared is that they are relatively
newer risks to society, as compared to natural risks like earthquakes and landslides.
For example, Litai [13], in his research conducted at MIT in the late 1970s in the
context of the safety of nuclear reactors, contends that a man-made risk is valued 20
times more than a natural risk. We will look at Litai's methodology and results in
section 2.4.1. Thus, it sounds reasonable to look closely at technological risks posed
to society at large.
Transportation risk is a type of technological risk. This risk can result from either
of the three main modes of transportation: road, rail and air transportation. Two
reasons can explain the increasing importance of transportation risk [16]:
1. The current transportation systems are highly sophisticated and have advanced
technologies built into them. This creates the potential for greater risks due to
higher levels of automation and the requirement of pin-point efficiencies.
2. The number of users of the system has increased. Even if the risk per user does
not change, the collective risk of society increases due to the increased number
of users.
2.2 Components of a Risk Assessment Study
As we described in the previous section, the issue of safety is very important for tech-
nical systems. Accidents in such systems are greatly feared, thus remedial measures
need to be taken even before the accident occurs. The risk assessment methodology
addresses just this issue.. It poses the following question for a technical system: Is
the system safe? [3] This question consists of two components:
1. What can happen?
2. What is acceptable?
The first question refers to risk analysis and falls under the domain of the technical
componant of risk assessment. The second question refers to risk appraisal and in-
volves value judgments and subjective guessing on the part of the team conducting
the risk assessment study. It is well known that the risk of a technical system can
be reduced to a negligible value, but can never be made equal to "zero." Absolute
safety is an impossible thing to achieve. The limit on increasing safety doesn't come
from safety itself, but from the resources that can be invested in safety. The re-
sources available for investing in safety are limited. This can also be interpreted as
the opportunity cost of investing in other areas. This limitation comes about because
safety is not the only consideration in social welfare, other issues such as amenities
and public goods are equally important. This leads us to the third component of risk
assessment: Investing in safety. The question that is posed is the following: Given the
limited resources available for safety, what is the optimal investment criterion such
that we can minimize the risks that we have to live with? This should not be viewed
as an avoidance of investing in safety, but rather as an attempt to allocate available
resources in such a way that maximum benefit is achieved in terms of risk reduction.
2.3 Risk analysis
As mentioned in the previous section, risk analysis refers to the technical component
of risk assessment. The outline of risk analysis is as follows:
1. Identify all the adverse events.
2. Determine the probability of occurrence of these events.
3. Determine the expected consequences of these events.
4. nMultiply the probability of occurrence by the expected consequences.
5. Sum over all the events considered.
Let i = 1, 2, 3..., n be all possible adverse events (i.e. the number of all the mutually
exclusive accident scenarios.) Let pi be the probability of occurrence of event i and
ci be its expected consequence. Then, the collective risk R is defined as:
R = pici (2.1)
i=1
The success of any risk analysis relies on an effective combination of various method-
ologies. These include a good engineering understanding of the system being ,eval-
uated, along with models from the domain of probability and statistics [17]. A de-
scription of the methodologies is given below:
* Engineering analysis: A thorough understanding of the system being studied is
necessary so that the analysis can be addressed to the specific problems of the
system.
* Probabilistic models: A few of the models used in risk assessment are given
here. Risk assessment comes under the realm of realibility engineering, which
deals with the probability and effects of system failures. When these system
failures lead to untoward consequences in terms of human injuries and fatalities,
it relates to the issue of safety. Another probabilistic model that is extensively
used is fault trees. Finally, a relatively new concept being employed is "emer-
gency response analysis" which talks about the specific emergency measures
that need to be taken in the event of an accident.
At this stage, it is important to distinguish the notion of risk as it depends on the
perspective being considered. Broadly, three perspectives come to the forefront in any
risk assessment study: an individual who is exposed to the risk, the societal risk and
the company which is responsible for the system creating the risk. Let us illustrate the
three notions of risk with the example of a level crossing accident. An individual who
goes across the level crossing assigns a certain probability to he being involved in an
accident. This probability fully describes the risk to the individual from going across
the level crossing. The individual is only concerned about his or her own risk, and
does not care about what happens to other people. But society is concerned about
what happens to a group of individuals as a whole. Here, the societal risk can be the
total number of people who are injured or killed in level crossing accidents every year
or per million trains going across the level crossing. This is simply the sum of all the
individual risks and is defined by the collective risk R as shown in Figure 2-1. The
company or agency has an additional issue to think about. It fears the occurrence
of catastrophic accidents which are "low probability high consequence" accidents. At
a level crossing, a catastrophic accident can occur as a result of a sequence of low
probability events occurring in succession to result in the extremely undesirable event.
Such accidents can damage the reputation of the company very badly and question
its very existence. For example, a catastrophic level crossing accident occurred in
Kasumbalesa in 1987 when a train collided with a large truck stuck at a crossing and
resulted in 100 passenger deaths and 125 total fatalities. This is directly related to
the notion of "perceived risk" that is discussed in the risk appraisal part of the risk
assessment study.
2.4 Risk appraisal
This branch of risk assessment looks at the issue of acceptability of risk and involves
value judgments. These judgments are not only confined to the domain of the techni-
cal expert, but involves people from all walks of life such as psychologists, sociologists,
economists, politicians, laymen etc. The question of the acceptability of risk becomes
tractable if quantitative values are assigned to it. But, assigning quantitative values
is not trivial since the issue of risk appraisal involves psychological factors and they
are difficult to quantify. Another issue that needs to be addressed in this context is
the way in which ideas about risk are communicated to society, because the public
Figure 2-1: Definition of individual and collective risk
response depends upon how these ideas are expressed.
2.4.1 Risk as perceived by the public
The society perceives risk in a way that is sometimes not in accordance with what
exactly happens in reality. This is the notion of perceived risk and is a very important
concept that needs to be addressed in any study related to safety.
An example that immediately comes to mind is the way the public perceives the
different types of transportation accidents. Automobile accidents result in approxi-
mately 120 deaths every day in the US. These accidents generally receive only a brief
coverage in the local newspapers and receive no mention in the national newspapers.
On the other hand, railroad and air travel are much safer than road travel, as shown
in Figure 2-2 [17]. But, railroad or aviation accidents receive national coverage f:or a
few weeks, as was shown by Sussman and Roth in their report on Amtrak's Sunset
Limited crash in Alabama [20].
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This leads us to the question of why some types of accidents are perceived more
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dangerous by the public and points to the following issues [17]:
* What are the factors which determine the way in which accidents are percieved
by the public?
* How does society decide as to which risk is acceptable and which is unaccept-
able?
We would like to address both these questions in the forthcoming discussion.
The question of the factors influencing the perceptions of risk was addressed by Daniel
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Litai [13] in the framework of the nuclear reactor safety study at MIT. The following
is a summary of his methodology and results:
* Litai first determined the different attributes of risk. He defined an attribute
as a 0-1 variable, with presence or absence of the attribute.
* Based on the attributes, he estimated the risks that humans are exposed to and
determined the acceptable levels of these risks using the method of revealed
preferences.
* He then compared the acceptable levels of two risks, which differ only by one
attribute.
* The ratio of these acceptable levels gave the relative weights of the attributes
in question.
* These ratios were called risk-conversion factors (RCF) and are presented in
Table 2.1 [13].
Pair of opposed attributes Risk Conversion Factor
Natural vs. Man made 1:20
Ordinary vs. Catastrophic 1:30
Voluntary vs. Involuntary 1:100
Delayed vs. Immediate 1:30
Controllable vs. Uncontrollable 1:5-10
Old vs. New 1:10
Necessary vs. Luxury 1:1
Regular vs. Occasional 1:1
Table 2.1: Risk Conversion Factors
In the present work, we are going to use these risk-conversion factors (RCF) to define
the notion of perceived risk. We emphasize the fact that the risk-conversion factors
(RCF) were developed in the context of nuclear reactor safety and could be different
for transportation systems or in different societies.
Let us now address the second question and look at some of the factors which deter-
mine the acceptability of risk [17].
* Countries and societies which have high death rates from natural causes such
as floods, earthquakes and epidemics are found to have high levels of "back-
ground risk." This is mainly found in third world countries where the level
of acceptability of risk is high. This leads to such societies accepting higher
risks in transportation as well. But affluent countries like Japan with high life
expectancies (or low background risk) demand high safety standards in trans-
portation.
* Catastrophic accidents, which have the potential for enormous consequences,
are extremely feared and society wants to reduce such risks even at high cost.
* New technologies demand relatively less tolerance than existing technologies.
* A man-made system warrants lower acceptability level of risk by society since
it is partly under the control of society, as opposed to natural hazards which
are totally out of human control.
* Risks that have delayed effects are accepted more easily by society than those
with immediate effects such as train accidents.
From the above discussion, it is evident that the answers to the two questions are
quite inter-related. In fact, the risk-conversion factors (RCF) quantitatively establish
the degree to which different attributes of risk are found acceptable or unacceptable
by society.
This quantification is incorporated by extending the existing definition of risk to
include the effect of the attributes on risk. This new term, called perceived risk R,,
is defined as
n
Rp= Zpicp(c) (2.2)
i= 1
where p(ci) : set of perceived risk weights that assign a relative importance to the
factors affecting the perceptions of risk
Another issue that is connected to the notion of perceived risk is the way in which
information about safety is disseminated to the public. Such information must be
conveyed in a way that it does not confuse the public because the public is heavily in-
fluenced by the way in which information is conveyed. This can best be illustrated by
an example. Let us consider the following three different ways to convey information
about the safety of air transportation in the US today [17].
1. "An individual boarding a domestic flight of one of the major airlines in the
United States will be killed in an aviation accident with probability equal to 1
in 4,000,000".
2. "If an individual takes a domestic flight of one of the major airlines in the
United States, the probability of he (or she) being killed in an accident is equal
to half the probability of winning the Big Prize in the "MegaBucks" Lottery in
the state of Massachusetts (One must choose correctly 6 out of a possible 36
numbers to win the lottery.)"
3. "If an individual takes a domestic flight on one of the major airlines in the United
States, the average time until he (or she) dies in an accident is approximately
11,000 years".
The first statement does not depict the actual probability clearly since very few peo-
ple can actually comprehend how small a probability 1 in 4,000,000 is. The second
statement is misleading since many people play the "MegaBucks" Lottery every 'week
and believe that they have a chance to win the prize. Someone does win the lottery
every week, so this comparison of airline safety to the chances of winning the lottery
can actually frighten people. The third statement is the most effective way of con-
veying information about the safety of air travel since people immediately know that
air travel cannot significantly affect their life expectancies.
Let us now turn to the third component of the risk assessment study, namely:, the
optimal allocation of resources.
2.5 Optimal Allocation of Resources
In this section, we address the question of how best we can allocate the limited
resources for safety such that we can achieve the maximum possible benefit. This is
a very important question from the viewpoint of the company or agency investing in
safety measures. Specifically, we talk about the extension of the existing definition of
risk to include the monetary cost of an accident and further discuss the methodology
by which an optimal decision can be made.
2.5.1 The Marginal Cost Criterion
Let us first look at the relationship between risk and cost as shown in Figure 2-3.
This curve is constructed as follows:
1. We first identify all the safety measures that can be applied to the system of
interest. We not only consider individual safety measures, but combinations of
safety measures as well because they may be more effective than the sum of the
individual measures taken together.
2. We then determine the cost and the benefit of each of the safety measures (and
their possible combinations). The benefit of each safety measure (and their
combinations) is measured as the reduction in the collective risk from the base
value of risk (which is point A in Figure 2-3).
3. Each safety measure (and their combinations) is plotted as an individual point
on a risk-cost diagram, the points representing the cost and the reduction in
risk for that safety measure (and their combinations).
4. The optimal curve for risk reduction is drawn by connecting all the points which
yield the largest reduction in risk for all possible values of the cost.This curve
is analogous to the curve obtained when determining the optimal combination
of factors of production for a firm in microeconomic theory. Thus, we call the
curve as the efficiency frontier for risk reduction.
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Figure 2-3: Optimal risk reduction investment
In theory, the risk reduction curve obeys diminishing marginal returns to scale. This
implies that the incremental cost of reducing the risk by one unit keeps increasing as
we go down the risk reduction curve. For the sake of argument, let us assume that
the consequences of a hazardous activity is the loss of human lives. The inverse slope
of the risk reduction curve is the incremental cost that is needed in order to reduce
the risk by one unit i.e. it is the marginal cost of saving a life. This marginal cost
can also be compared to the amount that one is willing to pay for a marginal increase
in safety i.e. it is the willingness-to-pay to save a life.
The definition of perceived risk can now be extended to include the marginal cost
criterion. The new definition, termed monetary collective risk Rm [4], is given by
n
Rm = E•p•icip(c)wi (2.3)
i=1
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where pi : probability of occurrence of event i
ci : expected consequences of event i
cp(ci) : set of perceived risk weights that assign a relative importance to the factors
affecting the perceptions of risk
wi : marginal cost or the willingness-to-pay to save a life
The advantages of including the marginal cost in the definition of risk are manifold [3]:
1. It makes the definition of risk more tractable and allows for the quantification
of value judgments.
2. Though we have included fatalities as the only consequence, other consequences
such as injuries, cost of damages etc can be conveniently added up to obtain
the collective risk.
2.5.2 Optimal Investment Level
In the last section, we established the definition of the monetary collective risk. Let
us now look at what is the optimal level of investment such that maximum benefit is
achieved in terms of risk reduction.
Consider Figure 2-3 which shows the relation between the cost of safety measures (in
$) plotted on the x-axis and the monetary collective risk Rm (in $) on the y-axis.
Let x denote the cost of some safety measure and R, the monetary collective risk
corresponding to that safety measure.
The benefit obtained from investment x is given by
BX = [Ro - Rx] - x (2.4)
Our goal is to maximize this benefit.
max Bx = [Ro - Rx] - x (2.5)
A necessary condition for x to be the optimal investment is
dB, = 0 (2.6)
dx
Rx* = -1 (2.7)
i.e. the marginal risk reduction per unit of investment is equal to -1.
This is the condition for the optimal investment level.
Chapter 3
Exploratory Analysis of the Level
Crossing Accidents
3.1 Introduction
JR East is the largest of the six private railroads in Japan, formed after the Japan
National Railways (JNR) was privatized in 1987. It is the largest provider of public
transportation in the busiest part of Japan. JR East provides services to approx-
imately 60 million people in metropolitan Tokyo and the 16 prefectures of eastern
Japan. A total workforce of around 80,000 provides service to 16.66 million passen-
gers every day. An average of 12,000 trains run on the network of 7,502 kilometers
every day. The statistics of JR East are shown in Table 3.1.
A railway network as large and complex as JR East is bound to be exposed to risks.
The company has recognized this and made safety its top priority. A total of 400
billion yen was invested in the five year period from 1989 to 1993 to achieve the goal
of "Zero Passenger Fatalities" [1]. Some of the investment was on installing the Auto-
matic Train Stop-Pattern (ATS-P) and upgrading level crossings by installing barriers
and obstacle detectors. If we look at the number of passenger fatalities per passenger-
km of service, JR East has had 13 passenger fatalities in 676 billion passenger-km of
service, or one fatality for every 52 billion passenger-km of service [19]. This measure
suggests that JR East is about 40 times safer than the German, English, French and
Number of employees 80,860
Passenger line network 7,502 km
Number of stations 1,708
Passengers (annual) 6.08 billion
Average trains per day 12,119
Average train-km per day 711,000
Average passengers per day 16.66 million
Rolling stock 14,046 cars
Electrification 5,457 km (72%)
Operating revenues 1,974 billion yen
Table 3.1: JR East statistics
US railroads [19].
The JR East network of 7,502 kilometers had a total of 927 level crossing accidents in
the six years from 1987 to 19921. The number of accidents declined every year during
this period. 247 accidents occurred at crossings in 1987, and reduced to 86 in 1.993.
Though none of the accidents resulted in major consequences for train passengers
and people on the road, a potential for catastrophic accidents does exist and will be
discussed in Section 3.8. In fact, some of the derailment accidents that have occurred
on the network have been at level crossings. These accidents can lead to catastrophic
consequences if the accident occurs in a crowded area during the peak period. The
potential for catastrophic accidents, thus, cannot be completely ruled out.
The most serious accident on the JR East network occurred in December, 1988 when
two trains collided at Higashinakano station. The driver of the train changed the
Automatic Train Stop (ATS) to manual override, though it was indicating the red
light implying that another train was in the vicinity. He did apply the brakes, but
there was not enough time to stop and the two trains collided at the station. This
accident resulted in 1 passenger fatality and 116 passenger injuries. This collision led
to the establishment of the Safety Research Laboratory in April, 1989. This labora-
tory carries out research in the areas of train separation control, accidents at level
1 Here, the year refers to the Japanese year. Thus, the six year data is from April, 1987 to March,
1993.
crossings, accidents due to natural hazards, human factors in railroad and the like.
3.2 The Level Crossing and Accident Databases
The Safety Research Laboratory of JR East maintains two databases to characterize
the level crossings on their network: The Level Crossing Database [10] and the Ac-
cident Database [9]. The Level Crossing Database contains the characteristics of all
the level crossings on the JR East railway network. As of September 1994, there were
a total of 7894 level crossings. The Level Crossing Database is extremely detailed in
its description of the crossings and has 92 attributes for each of the crossings. The
Level Crossing Database is given in Appendix 1 of the thesis.
The Accident Database gives the characteristics of the accidents that have occurred
since April, 1987 on these level crossings. A total of 927 accidents occurred from April,
1987 to March, 1993. Like the Level Crossing Database, the Accident Database is
detailed in its description of the accidents and has 57 attributes for each of the acci-
dents. The Accident Database is given in Appendix 2 of the thesis.
Let us now examine in detail the attributes of the Level Crossing Database and the
Accident Database.
3.2.1 The Level Crossing Database
The Level Crossing Database gives a detailed description of each of the level crossings
on the network. As of September 1994, there were a total of 7894 crossings. The
number of crossings decreased every year from 1987 to 1994. This is mainly due to
three factors:
* Crossings were eliminated by constructing overbridges or underpasses.
* Crossings were combined.
* The management of the line changed from JR East to some other company.
Each level crossing has 92 attributes associated with it. These attributes encompass
the entire gamut of the various characteristics of the crossing. Let us now go through
some of the definitions of the level crossing attributes:
* Track grade: There are four types of track grade:
1. Grade 1: Tracks that carry more than 20,000,000 tons/year.
2. Grade 2: Tracks that carry more than 10,000,000 tons/year but less than
20,000,000 tons/year.
3. Grade 3: Tracks that carry more than 5,000,000 tons/year but less than
10,000,000 tons/year.
4. Grade 4: Tracks that carry less than 5,000,000 tons/year.
* Level crossing grade: This refers to the type of safety measure present at the
crossing. They fall into three categories:
1. Grade 1 crossing: This crossing is equipped with a warning system and a
barrier. The warning system consists of a warning bell and flasher. Nor-
mally, there are two barriers on each side of the crossing. These barriers are
similar to the four quadrant gates found in the US. Figure 3-1 shows how
the safety devices at a typical Grade 1 level crossing function. Figure 4-1
shows the schematic diagram of a typical Grade 1 crossing.
2. Grade 3 crossing: This crossing is equipped only with a warning system.
There are around 300 Grade 3 crossings on the JR East network.
3. Grade 4 crossing: This crossing has only a level crossing sign. It is neither
equipped with a warning system nor a barrier.
* Gate mechanism: The barriers present at Grade 1 crossings can be operated in
three ways:
1. Automatic barrier: As the name suggests, this barrier is operated automat-
ically. It is connected to the train detection system. When the detection
system detects the approaching train, the barrier starts coming down and
is down before the train reaches the crossing.
2. Semiautomatic-automatic barrier: This type of barrier is installed in the
station area so that it can be operated manually as well as automatically.
The manual operation is usually done by the maintenance staff under the
supervision of the station master.
3. Non-automatic barrier: This barrier is present at crossings which are lo-
cated in urban areas and have a high volume of road traffic. They are
manually operated by three or four railroad people who ensure that all the
road traffic is cleared before the train reaches the crossing. At present,
there are no manual crossings on the JR East network.
* Alarm button: This is normally present on either side of the crossing. It is
placed in a convenient position so that it can be easily accessed in the event of
an emergency, and ensuring that it is out of the reach of children. It is connected
to the railroad signalling system and if activated, turns the signal red.
* Obstacle detector: This safety device can detect the presence of any road ve-
hicles stuck on the level crossing. Normally, 6 detectors are present at a single
track crossing. Figure 3-2 shows the position of the detectors at a single track
crossing. The S's are the sources of the laser beam and the R's are the receivers.
Any vehicle caught in the crossing breaks the path of the laser beam and acti-
vates the railroad signalling system connected to the detector. A vehicle should
be in the path of the beam for 6 sec continuously to activate the signal. The
detector is activated from the moment the warning bell starts ringing at the
crossing.
* Direction indicator: This device is connected to the train detection system and
indicates the direction from which the train is approaching the level crossing.
* Overhanging warning device: Some crossings have very low visibility on the or-
der of a few meters. At these crossings, the warning device is installed above the
road instead of by the side so that it can be easily seen by a vehicle approaching
the crossing.
* Rail traffic volume: This is the number of trains going across the level crossing
everyday.
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Figure 3-1: Operation of a Grade 1 level crossing
Figure 3-2: Placement of obstacle detectors at a level crossing
3.2.2 The Accident Database
The Accident Database gives a detailed description of the level crossing accidents.
The accidents in this database are recorded from April, 1987 to date. Let us define
some of the attributes of this database:
* Accident cause: JR East defines nine causes of accidents at level crossings. They
are explained below:
1. Intrusion against the level crossing gate: This accident occurs when the
level crossing barrier is down and a road vehicle intrudes against this barrier
and goes into the crossing area. This accident can occur only at a Grade
1 crossing (crossing equipped with a warning system and barrier.)
2. Ignorance of warning: At a Grade 1 crossing, this accident occurs during
the time between the ringing of the warning bell and the descent of the
level crossing barrier when the road vehicle ignores the bell and goes into
the crossing area but is not able to get out on the other side. This may
happen due to many reasons:
- The driver may panic resulting in the vehicle stopping in the middle
of the crossing.
- The driver might veer to the side of the road and get caught on the
crossing.
- The vehicle's engine might stop resulting in it being caught on. the
crossing.
At a Grade 3 crossing, this accident occurs from the moment the warning
bell starts ringing (there is no barrier at a Grade 3 crossing) and similar
circumstances result as explained for the case of the Grade 1 crossing.
3. Impossible traversing: This accident occurs only at a Grade 4 crossing
when the vehicle ignores the presence of the level crossing sign and tries
to go across the crossing.
4. Side hit: This accident is caused when the train is already at the crossing
and the vehicle goes into the crossing, either because the driver did not
perceive the presence of the crossing or he was intoxicated or was over-
speeding and did not have enough time to stop.
5. Clearance invasion: This accident occurs when the vehicle does not give
enough room for the train to get past the crossing - either the vehicle is
stopped beyond the stop line and too close to the tracks or it has something
projecting from it.
6. Wheek wreck: This accident occurs when the wheels of the vehicle are
stuck on the track as the vehicle has veered to the side of the crossing (the
difference in height is about 15 cm.)
7. Engine stalling: The engine of the vehicle stops as it is going across the
crossing.
8. Traffic congestion: This accident normally occurs when the crossing is
close to a road intersection. The vehicle enters the crossing but is not able
to get out because there are vehicles stopped in front of it at the road
intersection.
9. Device trouble: This accident occurs when one of the level crossing safety
devices do not work, thus allowing the unaware vehicle to go into the
crossing though a train is approaching the crossing. For JR East, this is
a very serious type of level crossing accident because it falls under their
responsibility. Accidents caused by device trouble may be due to four
factors:
- Mistake on wiring: A wiring mistake may result due to inappropriate-
ness between the blueprint and the actual wiring carried out.
- Mistake on maintanance: Mistake by a railroad employee during main-
tenance.
- Poor condition of short circuit: This occurs when there is a problem
with the circulation of current due to rust of the rails.
- Poor condition of treatment: This occurs at crossings equipped with
semiautomatic-automatic barriers. These barriers are seldom oper-
ated manually, so the maintenance crew sometimes forget to operate
the safety devices of the crossing. Accidents resulting due to these
mistakes are termed "poor condition of treatment."
3.3 Exploratory analysis of the Level Crossing
Database
As mentioned earlier, the level crossing database lists the characteristics of the 7894
crossings on the JR East system. We will now conduct an exploratory analysis of the
level crossing database.
3.3.1 Grade of the crossing
Table 3.2 shows the number and percentage of crossings of each grade. 85% of the
crossings are Grade 1 crossings. They are present throughout the JR East network.
4.7% of the crossings are Grade 3 crossings. These crossings are being eliminated by
converting them to Grade 1 crossings. 10.3% of the crossings are Grade 4 crossings.
These crossings are mainly located in rural areas and are predominantly single-track
crossings.
Grade of the crossing Number of crossings Percentage of crossings
Grade 1 6722 85%
Grade 3 372 4.7%
Grade 4 800 10.3%
Table 3.2: Level crossing grade
3.3.2 Number of crossing tracks
Table 3.3 shows the number and percentage of crossings of each grade having single
track, two tracks, three tracks, four tracks and five or more tracks.
Grade 1 Grade 3 Grade 4
No. of tracks No. of crs. % of crs. No. of crs. % of crs. No. of crs. % of crs.
Single 4215 80.6 293 5.6 719 13.8
Double 2282 93.8 75 3.1 75 3.1
Triple 89 96.7 1 1.1 2 2.2
Quadruple 78 98.7 1 1.3 0 -
Five or more 58 90.6 2 3.1 4 6.3
Table 3.3: Crossings by number of tracks
3.3.3 Visibility on the left and right
Figure 3-3 shows the visibility of the level crossing from the left and right side of the
road leading to the crossing. They indicate that the visibilities are approximately
log-normally distributed. 1645 crossings have less than 20 m visibility.
3.3.4 Road gradient
Table 3.4 shows the crossings grouped on the basis of the gradient of the road leading
to the crossing.
Road gradient Number of crossings
Level 1759
Upward 3577
Downward 2553
With steps 5
Table 3.4: Crossings by road gradient
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Figure 3-3: Visibility on the left and right of the crossing
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3.3.5 Distance of the crossing to the nearest intersection
Figure 3-4 shows the distance of the various crossings from the nearest road intersec-
tion. The top figure shows the distance of all crossings, whereas the bottom figure
shows the distance of only the Grade 1 crossings from the nearest intersection. The
mean distance of all the crossings is just 3.81 m and the mean distance of the GCrade
1 crossings is 4.14 m, both of which are less than the average length of a, single car
(which is about 5 m long). This has implications for accidents caused due to traffic
congestion and is discussed in Section 3.6.5.
3.3.6 Location of the crossing
Table 3.5 shows the percentage of crossings located in industrial, commercial, resi-
dential and rural areas. 94% of the crossings are located either in residential or rural
areas.
Location % of crossings
Rural 61.8
Residential 32.0
Commercial 3.3
Industrial 2.7
Port 0.1
Table 3.5: Crossings by location of the crossing
3.3.7 Obstacle detector
Table 3.6 shows the number of crossings equipped with an obstacle detector.
3.3.8 Rail traffic volume
Figure 3-5 shows the variation in the rail traffic volume at all crossings, at Grade 1
crossings, at Grade 3 crossings and Grade 4 crossings. The mean number of trains
going across the crossing per day is also indicated.
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Figure 3-4: Crossing distance (in m) from the nearest road intersection
Presence/absence of detector Number of crossings
None 6913
With detector 981
Table 3.6: Crossings by the presence or absence of an obstacle detector
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Figure 3-5: Rail traffic volume across all crossings
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3.3.9 Automobile traffic volume
Figure 3-6 shows the variation in the automobile traffic volume across crossings.
Most of the automobiles go across Grade 1 crossings (mean number of automobiles
is 732.73.) Very few automobiles go through Grade 3 and Grade 4 crossings.
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Figure 3-6: Variation of the automobile traffic volume across all crossings
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3.3.10 Freight truck traffic volume
Figure 3-7 shows the variation in the freight truck traffic across crossings. The mean
number of freight trucks per day (=19.04) is much lower than the number of auto-
mobiles per day (=617.90). Very few freight trucks go through Grade 3 and Grade 4
crossings.
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Figure 3-7: Freight truck traffic across crossings
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3.3.11 Motorcycle traffic volume
Figure 3-8 shows the variation in the motorcycle traffic across all crossings. The mean
number of motorcycles per day is 71.31 and the means are very low at Grade 3 and
Grade 4 crossings.
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Figure 3-8: Motorcycle traffic volume across all crossings
( ^ r
C
CO
S31%I--
o
E
Z
3.3.12 Number of pedestrians going across the crosing
Figure 3-9 shows the number of pedestrians going across the crossings. The mean
number going through all crossings is 215.00.
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Figure 3-9: Pedestrians going across all crossings
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3.3.13 Light vehicles going across all crossings
Figure 3-10 shows the number of light vehicles going across all crossings. These
vehicles include bicycles and small vehicles like scooters. The mean number of these
vehicles going through all crossings is 183.51.
3.4 Exploratory analysis of the Accident Database
A total of 927 accidents have occurred from April, 1987 to March, 1993. Let us now
explore the accident database.
3.4.1 Number of accidents with time
Figure 3-11 shows the variation of the number of accidents since the inception of JR
East in 1987. The number of accidents has been steadily declining indicating the
success of the JR East investment in safety. Most of the decline has been in the
earlier years and a relatively smaller decline has occurred in later years.
3.4.2 Number of accidents versus weather
Table 3.7 shows the number of accidents that have occurred at crossings having dif-
ferent weather conditions. These numbers have not been normalized, so the precise
effect of the weather on the accident rate cannot be determined.
Weather No. of accidents % of accidents
Sunny 556 59.98
Cloudy 233 25.13
Rainy 97 10.46
Snowy 37 3.99
Snow stormy 4 0.43
Table 3.7: Accidents with the weather at the crossing
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Number of light vehicles per day
0 100 200 300 400
Number of light vehicles per day
)500
S400
(0 2004-
0
100
E
z 0
Number of light vehicles per day
Number of light vehicles per day
100
Figure 3-10: Light vehicle traffic across all crossings
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3.4.3 Injuries in the accidents
Level crossing accidents have resulted in few injuries to passengers. 10 accidents
injured passengers on board and 3 injured passengers not on board. As shown in
Figure 3-12), a majority of the accidents did not lead to any injuries. 741 accidents
resulted in no injuries to third party persons2 , 163 led to 1 injury and 16 led to 2
injuries. 1 accident resulted in more than 9 injuries to third party persons. 733
accidents resulted in no injuries, 160 led to 1 injury and 18 led to 2 injuries.
3.4.4 Fatalities in the accidents
Level crossing accidents have not resulted in any passenger fatalities. Any fatalities,
if resulted, have been third party fatalities. 722 accidents have not resulted in any
third party fatality, 197 accidents led to 1 fatality and 8 accidents have resulted in 2
fatalities at the crossing (Figure 3-13).
3.4.5 Train delays as a result of the accidents
Accidents have not resulted in significant train delays. Mean delays of the order of
around 30-45 min have resulted from these accidents (Figure 3-14).
3.4.6 Train cancellations
The number of cancelled trains in the accidents has been much smaller than the
number of trains delayed. The mean accident has resulted in around 20 train can-
cellations, though one or two accidents have resulted in more than 100 trains being
cancelled (Figure 3-15).
2Third party persons refers to the people in automobiles and freight trucks, motorcyclists, bicy-
clists and pedestrians who are at the vicinity of the crossing on the road.
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Figure 3-12: Number of third party and total injuries in all accidents
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3.4.7 Number of accidents by type of traffic involved
Table 3.8 shows the number of accidents that have occurred with respect to the type
of traffic involved in the concerned accident. Automobiles account for almost half of
the level crossing accidents (45.63%).
Traffic type No. of accidents % of accidents
Passenger automobile 423 45.63
Freight truck 146 15.75
Pedestrian 130 14.02
Light vehicle 88 9.49
Motorcycle 70 7.55
Farming automobile 17 1.83
Large sized freight truck 16 1.73
Dump truck 7 0.76
Bus 6 0.65
Special automobile 6 0.65
Tricycle automobile
Table 3.8: Accidents by type of traffic involved
3.4.8 Accident causes
The exact definition of the various causes of accidents at level crossings was given in
Section 3.2.2.
Causes at all crossings
Table 3.9 gives the number and percentage of accidents by cause3 . Intrusion against
the level crossing gate and ignorance of warning account for 53% of the accidents.
Causes by grade of the crossing
Table 3.10 shows the split of the accidents that have occurred at different crossing
grades by cause of the accident.
3Some of the accidents caused due to impossible traversing have been accounted under Grade 1
crossings, though they should only be for Grade 4 crossings.
Accident cause No. of accidents % of accidents
Intrusion against LC gate 145 15.64
Ignorance of warning 196 21.14
Impossible traversing 151 16.29
Side hit 36 3.88
Clearance invasion 77 8.31
Wheel wreck 93 10.03
Engine stalling 93 10.03
Traffic congestion 67 7.23
Device trouble
Others 69 7.44
Table 3.9: Accidents by cause
Accident cause Total acc. Grade 1 Grade 3 Grade 4
Intrusion against LC gate 145 145 0 0
Ignorance of warning 196 143 43 0
Side hit 36 34 1 1
Clearance invasion 77 68 3 6
Wheel wreck 93 83 8 2
Engine stalling 93 91 0 2
Traffic congestion 67 67 0 0
Device trouble 0 0 0 0
Others 69 66 2 1
Table 3.10: Accidents by grade of accident for different causes
68
Sub-causes for the accidents
In this section, sub-causes of some of the accident causes are explored and the rel-
ative contribution of these sub-causes to the occurrence of a level crossing accident
is determined. The causality trees for the level crossing accidents are constructed as
follows:
1. The primary or system failure is the accident which occurs at the level crossing.
2. The events leading to this accident are the various causes of level crossing ac-
cidents. Seven causes of accidents are considered: intrusion against the level
crossing gate, ignorance of warning, side hit, clearance invasion, wheel wreck,
engine stalling and traffic congestion.
3. Sub-trees are constructed for some of the accident causes.
The causality trees are constructed for automobile accidents, and the information
about the accidents has been obtained from the Safety Research Laboratory of JR
East.
Figure 3-16 shows the break up by seven different causes of automobile accidents at
the crossings. 33% of the accidents have occurred when the automobile has ignored
the level crossing warning and gone into the crossing, but has been unable to come
out on the other side. 10% of the accidents have occurred due to intrusion against
the level crossing gate. This is less than the percentage of accidents due to ignorance
of warning, and is supported based on observations of two crossings on the JR East
network. 45% of the accidents have occurred when the automobile is caught after
legally entering the crossing. Though the obstacle detector has reduced the number
of accidents caused due to wheel wreck, engine stalling and traffic congestion, they
are an issue of concern in urban areas where crossings have high road and rail traffic
volumes.
In the second tier, we show the break up of the accidents caused due to intrusion
against the level crossing gate, ignorance of warning and side hit. Sub-trees are
not constructed for accidents caused due to clearance invasion, wheel wreck, engine
stalling and traffic congestion due to the unavailability of data for these causes.
Figure 3-17 shows the sub-tree for accidents caused due to intrusion against the level
crossing gate. Though the major reason for the intrusion is unclear, some accidents
have occurred when the driver is not concentrating on the road, the driver is drunk,
he is overspeeding or the vehicle slips due to snow.
Figure 3-18 shows the sub-tree for accidents caused due to ignorance of the level
crossing warning. 68% of the automobile accidents have occurred when the driver
has deliberately ignored the level crossing warning and gone into the crossing,, but
has not been able to come out on the other side. About 20% of the accidents have
occurred when the driver did not hear the warning bell and unknowingly went into
the crossing area. 3% of the accidents have occurred when cars went into the crossing
after the warning bell stopped ringing and immediately started ringing as another
train was approaching the crossing. This scenario is discussed in Section 4.2 in the
analysis of the perceived actions of the road vehicles when they approach the crossing.
Figure 3-19 shows the sub-tree for accidents caused due to side hit. Driver mistake
has accounted for about 60% of the accidents.
The various sub-causes of automobile accidents are categorized by the characteristics
of the accident and tabulated. Table 3.11 shows the probabilities by cause when the
driver was aware of the existence of the crossing and the on-coming train, but the
accident occurred. This includes the major cause of accidents where the vehicle went
into the crossing even though the warning bell was ringing, but could not get out
(22.08%).
Table 3.12 shows the accidents due to vehicles caught in the crossing. 45% of the
accidents have occurred due to wheel wreck, engine stalling and traffic congestion
where the vehicle has legally entered the crossing.
Table 3.13 shows the accidents that have occurred due to the vehicle being unaware
of the crossing.
Finally, Table 3.14 shows the accidents that have occurred due to driver mistake.
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Figure 3-18: Ignorance of warning subtree
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Figure 3-19: Side hit subtree
I
Accident cause Likelihood
Goes into crossing, cannot get out 22.08%
Clearance invasion 7.85%
Table 3.11: Accidents caused though driver was aware of the crossing
Accident cause Likelihood
Wheel wreck 18.25%
Engine stalling 15.88%
Traffic congestion 11.31%
Table 3.12: Accidents caused due to vehicles caught in the crossing
Accident cause Likelihood
Driver does not hear bell (stereo on) 2.92%
Unconscious 1.09%
Car turns and goes into intersection 0.55%
Driver sleeping 0.18%
Bad sight 0.18%
Table 3.13: Accidents due to the driver being unaware of the crossing
Accident cause Likelihood
Not concentrating while driving 2.91%
Drunken driving 2.19%
Overspeeding 1.10%
Momentary stop and start of warning bell 1.09%
Goes ahead in a hurry 0.73%
Goes ahead at Grade 4 crossing 0.55%
Car is stopped but mistake in starting the car 0.36%
Early release of brake 0.36%
Car slips due to snow 0.33%
Truck cannot stop as it is carrying heavy material 0.18%
Car hits another car at crossing and intrudes 0.18%
Early release of clutch 0.18%
Mistake in starting automatic car 0.36%
Driver gets off and car goes ahead 0.18%
Table 3.14: Accidents caused due to driver mistake
3.4.9 Accidents by time of day
Figure 3-20 shows the number of accidents that have occurred by time of the day.
Accidents have occurred at all hours of the day, except during the morning hours of
12 AM to 5 AM when few (or no) trains are running.
3.5 Development of the methodology for the level
crossing accident rates
The last two sections talk about the characteristics of the level crossings and the
accidents that have occurred on these crossings. This sets the stage for establishing
the equations for determining the accident rate and the monetary collective risk R,
of a level crossing accident. The definition of the risk of an accident is composed of
two parts:
* Accident rate
* Weighted average consequences per accident
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Figure 3-20: Accidents by time of day
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3.5.1 Accident rate
Level crossing accidents are not a common occurrence at any intersection on the JR
East system. The extremely safe operating environment has dramatically reduced
the number of level crossing accidents to less than a hundred accidents per year.
Thus, the accident rate is established for a group of level crossing accidents, with the
crossings in the group having similar characteristics; rather than for a single accident
at a level crossing. The accident rate pi for a level crossing accident with accident
cause i is defined as
Acci
= LC x (RTV) x (365) x (P.e) (3.1)
where
Acci: Number of accidents occurring due to cause i
LCi: Number of level crossings in the concerned group
RTV: Rail traffic volume per day
365: 365 days per year
P.e: Period of exposure, in years (the period of exposure is defined as the period in
which the accidents have occurred at the crossings)
Thus, the accident rate gives the number of accidents per million trains going across
the level crossing.
Some of the accident prediction formulas discussed in Chapter 1 use the product of
the rail traffic volume and the road traffic volume to determine the accident rate of a
level crossing accident. We use only the rail traffic volume as the denominator term
to define the accident rate. Two reasons can be ascribed for this:
1. It corroborates the finding that crossings with low rail and highway traffic are
riskier than those with high rail and highway traffic. Table 3.15 shows that this
is indeed the case. An intuitive explanation for this is as follows. At the low
rail traffic volume crossings, the road traffic volume is also low (a few hundred
vehicles per day at most) because these crossings are located in non-urban areas.
Thus, a vehicle arriving at the crossing is likely to be the first vehicle at the
crossing. This greatly increases its risk of being involved in an accident since it
may ignore the warning and go into the crossing just as the train is coming. On
the other hand, crossings with high rail traffic volume are located in urban areas
which have high road traffic volumes (of the order of a few thousand vehicles per
day). A vehicle arriving at this crossing is less likely to be the first vehicle. The
chance of it ignoring the warning is also less since there are possibly vehicles
in front of it which will stop at the warning bell (this is not to say that the
vehicles in front will always stop, but the chance that two or three vehicles will
ignore the warning is very slim). This is confirmed from the level crossing site
visits done by the author.
2. It allows us to compare the accident rate at the crossing with respect to the
different types of road traffic.
RTV #LC #Acc Acc. rate(per million trains)
0-20 542 23 1.938
20-40 1852 111 0.913
40-60 1145 112 0.893
60-80 1181 102 0.563
80-100 564 56 0.504
100-120 672 69 0.426
120-160 565 85 0.490
160-200 411 87 0.537
200-400 765 175 0.348
Table 3.15: Accident rate as a function of rail traffic volume
3.5.2 Weighted average consequences per accident
We consider the following four as the consequences of a level crossing accident:
* Third party fatalities
e Third party injuries
* Train delays
* Train cancellations
Passenger fatalities and injuries have not been included since none of the level crossing
accidents have resulted in injuries or deaths to passengers on the train. In addition to
train delays and cancellations, disruptions of the road traffic can also be considered,
but the road traffic does have alternate routes to get to their destinations unlike the
rail traffic. In any case, disruption of road traffic does become an issue of concern in
densely populated areas like Tokyo. The above mentioned consequences can be easily
included in the definition of the weighted average consequences as an additive term.
So, in the first step, the total consequences ci resulting from an accident due to cause
i can be defined as
ci = Fatalities + Injuries + Train delays + Train cancellations
The collective risk R can be defined as
8
R = Epc (3.2)
i=1
where
i=1... 8 are the eight accident causes, as defined in Section 3.2.2
pi: Accident rate with cause i
ci: Total consequences resulting from cause i
This definition of risk can be extended to include the risk conversion factors (RCF)
that was discussed in Section 2.4.1. We do not attempt to determine the exact risk
conversion factors, but draw upon the work done by Nasser [16] in the construction of
the Safety Performance Index. Table 3.16 [16] shows the risk perception weights for
Risk Perception Weight
Passengers on board 100
Other passengers 5
Third-party persons 1
Sub-contracted workers 5
Employees on duty 100
Employees off duty 100
Delays 1
Table 3.16: Risk Perception Weights for Different Outcomes
different outcomes. Since the level crossing accidents have not involved any casualties
to passengers on board and have resulted in third party injuries and fatalities and
train delays and cancellations, a risk conversion factor of 1 is appropriate for the
consequences. Thus, p(c2) is assigned a value 1 in the definition of the perceived risk
R, and is given as
8
R, = pici (3.3)
i=1
since
p(ci) = 1 in the definition of the perceived risk R,
This definition of risk can be extended to include the marginal cost or the willingness-
to-pay of the consequences of the crossing accidents. Let us address each consequence
one by one.
1. Fatality: In this study, we do not explicitly determine the value of a life. We
present a brief discussion of the work done by several researchers and the
methodologies that have been developed to determine the value of a human
life.
Nasser [16] presents a comprehensive discussion of the twvo methodologies cur-
rently used to determine the value of a life: human capital theory approach
and willingness-to-pay approach. The human capital theory approach centers
around the premise that the value of a life is the cost to society from this loss of
life. The willingness-to-pay approach treats risk as an economic good [16] and
argues that an appropriate measure for risk reduction is the price that one is
willing to pay to realise this reduction in risk. As shown in Table 3.17 [16] which
shows the values of life used in selected circumstances in various countries, the
willingness-to-pay approach provides higher estimates of the value of life than
the human capital theory approach (more scattered). The US estimate is the
value used by the Department of Transportation (DOT) in safety management
programs.
Two approaches can be used to determine the amount that one is willing to
Cost of Road Accident Death value of life($) Estimation Basis
United States 2,600,000 Willingness-to-pay
Sweden 1,236,000 Willingness-to-pay
New Zealand 1,150,000 Willingness-to-pay
Britain 1,100,000 Willingness-to-pay
Germany 928,000 Human capital theory
Belgium 400,000 Human capital theory
France 350,000 Human capital theory
Holland 130,000 Human capital theory
Portugal 20,000 Human capital theory
Table 3.17: The Value of Life
pay to reduce his risk by a certain amount. They are:
(a) Revealed preferences (using data from the job market) [16]
(b) Stated preferences (using survey analysis) [16]
We do not present the details of the two approaches, but refer the interested
reader to the discussion in Nasser [16].
The value of life shows significant variations across different countries (Ta-
ble 3.17), the cultural background and the background risk.
For our study, we compare the estimates of the value of life arrived at by the
Safety Research Laboratory of JR East, values used by transportation agencies
around the world and those determined by Viscusi [16]. We then select; the
median estimate of the value of life.
JR East suggests an estimate of $256,000 for the value of a life [16]. This is
close to the estimates in the lower half of Table 3.17 for the value of life in
different countries. The United States uses a value of $2,600,000 based on the
willingness-to-pay approach (Table 3.17). The scatter of these values suggests
that the estimation of the value of a life is no mean task and points to the
preliminary nature of the results. Thus, we use a median scenario of $1,000,000
as the estimate of the value of a life (corresponding to the intermediate scenario
in Table 4.2 [16]).
2. Injury: The value of an injury is easier to determine than the value of a life
since it is not associated with the ethics of determining what one's life is worth.
The Safety Research Laboratory calculate the value of an injury to be $10,000
or 1 million yen [16]. We use this estimate to be the marginal cost of an injury.
3. Train delay: Nasser [16] determines the cost of train delays to be $200 per hour
and $20 per hour as the value of passenger's time. The mean delay time of a
crossing accident is 30 minutes. This gives the total cost of a train delay (for a
train with 1000 passengers) to be $10,000 or 1 million yen.
4. Train cancellation: A train cancellation warrants the provision of either a refund
of the ticket (determined as $10 [16]) or alternate service to the passengers as a
result of the cancellation (determined as $ 60 [16]). We consider a mean value
of $40 as the value of a refund. A train cancellation which results after a 2 hour
train delay has a cost of around $80,000 or 8 million yen. Thus, we assign a
marginal cost of 10 million yen to a train cancellation.
The monetary collective risk, Rm, can be given as
8
Rm = • Pi x [100 x (fai) + 1 x (ini) + 1 x (tdi) + 10 x (tci)] (3.4)
i=1
where
fai: third party fatality
ini: third party injury
tdi: train delay
tci: train cancellation
3.6 Analysis of the crossings and accidents
This section looks at possible relationships between the level crossing attributes and
the accidents that have occurred at these crossings. The analysis is not exhaustive,
in the sense that it does not cover all possible crossing attributes. Instead, we present
a few examples and show how these relationships can be established for any of the
crossing attributes.
3.6.1 Comparison by grade of the crossing
Table 3.18 shows the percentage of crossings and accidents that correspond to the
different level crossing grades. Grade 3 and Grade 4 crossings have had more than
their share of accidents. 4.7% of the crossings are Grade 3, whereas they have had
7% of the accidents; 10.3% of the crossings are Grade 4 and they have had 17% of
the accidents.
3.6.2 Comparison by visibility of the crossing
Figure 3-21 shows the distribution of the minimum visibility o# the left and right at
all crossings and crossings where accidents have occurred. The visibility at all the
crossings is approximately lognormally distributed. The mean visibility is almost the
Crossing grade %Cr. %Acc. %Acc./%Cr.
Grade 1 85 76 0.894
Grade 3 4.7 7 1.489
Grade 4 10.3 17 1.650
Table 3.18: Crossings and accidents by grade of the crossing
same in both cases. In section 3.7.1, we will develop the accident rates on the basis
of the visibility of the crossing.
3.6.3 Comparison by the width of the crossing
The width of the crossing refers to the number of tracks present in the crossing. Cross-
ings with single or double tracks have fewer number of accidents since a significant
number of them are Grade 3 or Grade 4 crossings through which automobiles do not
go through. Table 3.19 shows the percentage of crossings and accidents for different
widths of the crossing.
#Tracks %Cr. %Acc. %Acc./%Cr.
1 66.2 48.6 0.734
2 30.8 42.1 1.367
3 1.2 2.7 2.250
4 1.0 2.5 2.500
>= 5 0.8 4.1 5.130
Table 3.19: Crossings and accidents by number of tracks
3.6.4 Comparison by location of the crossing
90% of the accidents have occurred in residential and rural areas and they account
for 94% of the crossings. But residential areas have had more than their share of
accidents (32% of the crossings are in residential areas and they have had 48.3% of
the accidents). Table 3.20 shows the percentage of crossings and accidents by the
location of the crossing.
1 1.5 2
loglO(Minimum visibility on left and right)
2.5 3
__I- -j
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
loglO(Minimum visibility on left and right)
2.5 3
Figure 3-21: Crossings and accidents by visibility of the crossing
Location %Cr. %Acc. %Acc./%Cr.
Rural 61.8 43.4 0.702
Residential 32.0 48.3 1.519
Commercial 3.3 4.8 1.455
Industrial 2.7 3.2 1.185
Table 3.20: Crossings and accidents by location of the crossing
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Comparison of the crossing distance to the nearest
intersection and accidents due to traffic congestion
22 shows that almost 50 of the 65 accidents caused due to traffic congestion
:ssings where the distance to the nearest intersection is less than 5m, which
ent with the fact that 80% of the crossings are less than 5m from the nearest
rsection on either side.
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3.7 Accident rate and the risk
In this section, we look at the variation in the accident rate and the monetary collec-
tive risk Rm across the different level crossing attributes such as visibility and road
gradient, and the various safety devices at the crossing.
3.7.1 Visibility of the crossing
The accident rate (per million trains) is higher when the visibility of the crossing is
lower, but it is significant only for crossings with very low visibilities (of 20m or less).
The accident rates are more or less the same for crossings with visibilities greater than
20m. Table 3.21 shows the accident rate for crossings with visibility less than 20m and
visibility greater than 20m. The mean accident rate for crossings with visibility less
than 20m is 0.705 (per million trains) and is 0.509 (per million trains) for crossings
with greater than 20m visibility. The difference in the rates is statistically significant
(as described in Section D.2).
Another issue that is related to the visibility of the crossing is the road traffic volume
at the crossing. We reinforce the argument made in Section 3.5 that low rail traffic
volume crossings are riskier than high rail traffic volume ones. Table 3.22 shows
the accident rate (per million automobiles) by visibility for three categories of road
traffic volume. These accident rates are established for Grade 1 crossings without
obstacle detectors. The accident rate is highest for crossings with low road traffic
(0-100 vehicles per day) and decreases by a factor of 10 as the road traffic increases
(100-1000 vehicles per day) and further reduces by a factor of 10 for high road traffic
(1000-10000 vehicles per day). The difference in the accident rates is highly significant
(the null hypothesis is rejected at p=0.01). Thus, crossings with low road traffic are
riskier to road users than those with high road traffic. Since low road traffic crossings
also have fewer trains, low rail traffic volume crossings are riskier than high rail traffic
volume ones.
Accident rate (per million trains)
RTV 0-20m >20m
0-40 1.096 0.828
40-80 0.725 0.537
80-120 0.559 0.309
120-160 0.441 0.361
Table 3.21: Accident rates by visibility of the crossing
Accident rate (per million automobiles)
Visibility(m) 0-100 100-1000 1000-10000
0-20 0.395 0.040 0.006
20-50 0.252 0.028 0.003
50-100 0.170 0.020 0.005
>100 0.151 0.020 0.004
Table 3.22: Accident rates by road traffic volume and visibility
3.7.2 Road gradient
The road gradient is defined as the gradient of the road leading to the level crossing.
The gradient can either be level, upward or downward. Table 3.23 shows the accident
rate for four categories of rail traffic volume and for two categories of the road gradient
(level and not level). In general, the accident rate is higher as the gradient is either
upward or downward. The mean accident rate for a level road is 0.427 per million
trains and is 0.550 per million trains for a road with gradient. The difference in the
accident rates is statistically significant (as shown in Section D.3).
3.7.3 Crossings by grade, but without obstacle detector
Figure 3-23 shows the variation in the accident rate across the three level crossing
grades [14]. Grade 1 crossings are safer than Grade 4 crossings, ývhich are in turn safer
than Grade 3 crossings. Even though Grade 3 crossings are eq ipped with a warning
system, they are present throughout the JR East network an4 have a considerable
amount of road traffic going through. By contrast, most of thel Grade 4 crossings are
UAccident rate (per million trains)
Level Not level
0.716 0.833
0.280 0.626
0.258 0.357
0.455 0.382
Table 3.23: Accident rates by road gradient
located in rural areas and have just a few trains and road vehicles going by everyday.
In addition, most of the traffic going through is either pedestrian or bicycle traffic
leading to a lower accident rate than Grade 3 crossings.
At low rail traffic volumes, the accident rate is the lowest for Grade 1 crossings and
the highest for Grade 3 crossings. The accident rate drops as the rail traffic volume
increases and then steadies out. The mean accident rate at Grade 1 crossings is 0.588
per million trains, for Grade 3 crossings is 1.250 per million trains and is 0.758 per
million trains at Grade 4 crossings.
The collective risk Rm (per million trains) follows the same pattern as the accident
rate and is the highest for Grade 3 crossings (Figure 3-23). Since the consequences
increase with increasing rail traffic volume, the risk has a steady value as the accident
rate is decreasing with increasing rail traffic. The mean risk at Grade 1 crossings is
45 million yen (per million trains), 103 million yen (per million trains) at Grade 3
crossings and is 61 million yen (per million trains) at Grade 4 crossings.
3.7.4 Crossings by type of barrier, but without obstacle
detector
Crossings with semiautomatic-automatic barrier are slightly safer than those equipped
with automatic barrier (Figure 3-24) [14]. The accident rate is higher for the low rail
traffic volume crossings, and steadily drops with increasing r il traffic. The mean
accident rate for crossings with automatic barrier is 0.623 p r million trains and
is 0.601 per million trains for crossings with semiautomatic a tomatic barrier (the
RTV
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Figure 3-24: Accident rate and the collective risk for crossings by type of barrier
difference in the accident rates is not statistically significant).
The risk has a steady value across rail traffic and is slightly lower for crossings with
semiautomatic-automatic barrier ( 3-24). The mean risk for crossings equipped with
an automatic barrier is 50 million yen (per million trains) and is 36 million yen (per
million trains) for crossings with semiautomatic automatic barrier.
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3.7.5 Crossings equipped with obstacle detector
The installation of obstacle detectors has helped in reducing accidents at level cross-
ings (as shown in Figure 3-25) [14]. The mean accident rate reduces from 0.428 per
million trains to 0.123 per million trains at the crossings after the installation of
detectors (this difference is statistically significant as shown in Section D.4). The
monetary collective risk reduces by a factor of 7 at crossings with the detector (the
risk decreases from 54 million yen (per million trains) to 7 million yen (per million
trains)).
3.7.6 Crossings by grade, and equipped with obstacle de-
tector
Obstacle detectors have been very effective in reducing the number of accidents at
Grade 1 crossings (as shown in Figure 3-26) [14]. The mean accident rate reduces by
nearly a factor of 10 at crossings where obstacle detectors are installed. The mean rate
decreases from 0.479 per million trains to 0.060 per million trains and is statistically
significant (the null hypothesis is rejected at p=0.01). The monetary collective risk
decreases from 59.62 million yen (per million trains) to 3.55 million yen (per million
trains) and is significant (p=0.01).
3.7.7 Crossings by type of safety device and road traffic
This analysis looks at the variation in the accident rate and the monetary collective
risk at crossings grouped by the type of safety device present at the crossing (Grade
1 crossing with automatic barrier, Grade 1 crossing with semiautomatic automatic
barrier, Grade 3 crossing and Grade 4 crossing) and the road traffic involved in the
accident (passenger automobile, freight truck, motorcycle, bicycle, pedestrian and
light vehicle). We do not present the detailed analysis here, but include it in Appendix
3 of the thesis. This data is included as an input to the risk model discussed in Chapter
4. Figure 3-27 shows a schematic diagram of the analysis that We have carried out for
the crossings by type of safety device and the road traffic involved in the accident.
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94
0.
I
0.
Co
0.
100
b I I I I
Before detector4
2 After detector
..... 1
Before detector
After detector
I - I I - I
A
100
150
Rail traffic volume
150
Rail traffic volume
200 250
200
30
3C250
Figure 3-26: Accident rate and the collective risk at Grade 1 crossings without ob-
stacle detector
0.6
Before detector
F 2
After detector
j • --- "-"-' . .
Before detector
After detector
_ I I I I I
- p I ' --., • I I I I
100 0
0
No
detector
Automatic
barrier
Semiautomatic
automatic
barrier
Grade 3
crossing
Grade 4
crossing
volume and
volume and
volume and
volume and
volume and
volume and
automobile traffic volume
freight truck traffic
motorcycle traffic
bicycle traffic
pedestrian traffic
light vehicle traffic
Figure 3-27: Accident rate and the collective risk for crossings by type of safety device
and road traffic involved in the accident
Before
detector
After
detector
1 to 6 1 to 6 1 to 6
1 to 6 1 to 6 1 to 6
1 to 6 1 to 6 1 to 6
1 to 6 1 to 6 1 to 6
Rail
Rail
Rail
Rail
Rail
Rail
traffic
traffic
traffic
traffic
traffic
traffic
U3.8 A first order estimate of catastrophic acci-
dents
Accidents that result in catastrophic consequences have a very low probability of oc-
currence. But the occurrence of such accidents cannot be ruled out, since the risk of
such an accident is not "zero." The level crossing accidents on the JR East network
have resulted in minor consequences for the people standing by the crossing and neg-
ligible consequences for the people on board the train. These accidents can become
catastrophic if it involves a collision between a train and a large vehicle such as a truck
or a bus, and the effect can be compounded if the crossing is located in an urban
area. In fact, level crossing accidents that have occurred with major consequences
around the world have involved either a truck or a bus hitting the train [2].
The difficulty associated with estimating the likelihood of these accidents is that
accidents of such a nature have never occurred on the JR East network. Thus, de-
termining the probability of such accidents is no mean task. The following guidelines
can be used to estimate the probability [7]:
1. "Estimates of "the" probability of an accident must include, explicitly or im-
plicitly, contributions from all the possible sources of the accident."
2. "The widest related base of potential accident experience (exposure) should be
surveyed for indications about the probability of an accident for a particular
kind of experience."
3. "The combination of estimates of probability in parts of a system to reach
overall estimates of probability is subject to subtle errors and must be carefully
reviewed."
4. "Possible sources of error and uncertainty in estimates should be explicitly con-
sidered and, whenever possible, estimated quantitatively."'
5. "Estimates of probabilities should be reported in ways n6t likely to mislead."
6. "Judgmental estimates of accident probabilities face difficulties of reasoned sub-
stantiation and provide numerous opportunities for bias. Their basis in evidence
may not be explicit but should be free of mistakes and clear biases."
3.8.1 Procedure for estimating the risk
The following procedure is used to determine an upper bound on the risk of a catas-
trophic level crossing accident on the JR East network:
1. Determine the accident rate (per million trains) of a level crossing accident
involving trucks and buses.
2. Find the weighted average consequences (i.e. consequences with the weights as
defined in Section 3.5.2) of an accident involving trucks and buses.
3. Find the risk of an accident involving trucks and buses. This risk gives an upper
bound to the risk of a catastrophic accident at a level crossing since the accident
rate is an upper bound on the probability of a catastrophic accident and the
consequences consider the worst scenarios of level crossing accidents around the
world.
3.8.2 Calculation of the risk
To calculate the accident rate (per million trains) of an accident involving trucks
and buses, we look at the level crossing accidents on the JR East network that have
involved large trucks and buses. Assuming a mean rail traffic volume of 90 trains
per day, the accident rate for trucks is 0.026 per million trains and 0.012 per million
trains for buses. These accident rates give an upper bound to the probability of a
catastrophic accident involving trucks and buses since an accident with large conse-
quences has a lower likelihood than an accident with lower consequences.
The consequences of a catastrophic accident involving trucks! and buses are deter-
mined from the Global Accident Database for level crossings. maintained by Ernst
Basler and Partners, Switzerland [2]. This database gives a list of 50 of the worst
level crossing accidents that have occurred between 1981 and 1994. These accidents
have mainly been collected from media reports. Of course, the database may not be
comprehensive in terms of including all the worst accidents, but it gives an idea of the
consequences of accidents with large trucks and buses. Thus, the weighted average
consequences of an accident involving trucks (from a total of 20 accidents) is 92,570
million yen and buses (from a total of 30 accidents) is 20,975 million yen. Trucks have
higher weighted consequences than buses as truck accidents have involved higher pas-
senger fatalities than bus accidents.
This gives the monetary collective risk Rm of an accident involving trucks to be 2.4
billion yen (per million trains) and buses to be 0.24 billion yen (per million trains).
As discussed above, these risks give an upper bound to the risk of a catastrophic level
crossing accident on the JR East network.
Chapter 4
A Risk Model for the Level
Crossing Accidents
4.1 Importance of human factors
Human factors play a crucial role in determining the causal factors behind level
crossing accidents. 53% of the accidents at crossings have occurred due to intrusion
against the level crossing gate, ignorance of the level crossing warning and illegally
going through a Grade 4 level crossing (going through the crossing without confirming
whether a train is coming or not). These accidents have a significant contribution
from the human side, in addition to the different attributes of the crossing. Besides,
the nature of these accidents makes it difficult to be prevented by the obstacle detector
which has been very successful in reducing the accidents caused due to wheel wreck,
engine stalling and traffic congestion. Also, the accident causality analysis carried
out in Section 3.4.8 shows that 22% of the automobile accidents have occurred when
the vehicle has gone into the level crossing after the warning bell starts ringing, but
has been unable to come out of the crossing. This can happen due to many reasons:
1. The vehicle may go into the crossing as the barrier is 4lmost down, and the
driver may panic resulting in the vehicle stopping in the 4iiddle of the crossing.
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2. The vehicle may be involved in a wheel wreck, resulting in it getting caught in
the crossing.
Thus, the above arguments suggest that the human factors of the driver are a very
important component of the level crossing accidents. To that end, we decided to
observe a few level crossings on the JR East network and get a feel for the perceived
actions of the road vehicles at the crossing. This was done during my internship at
JR East in the summer of 1995. I observed two Grade 1 crossings in the Tokyo area.
1. Crossing located near Kunitachi station, on the Chuo Line. We will refer to
this crossing as Crossing I.
2. Crossing located near Kamata station, on the Tokaido and Keihin-Tohoku Lines.
We will refer to this crossing as Crossing II.
I observed Crossing I in the morning peak hours of 8.00AM to 10.00AM. I observed
Crossing II in the evening peak hours of 5.30 PM to 7.00PM and in the night time
from 9.30PM to 11.00PM.
Our interest was on observing the behavior of the road traffic at the crossing, so we
observed the traffic from both the directions going across the crossing. The flow of
traffic was recorded on tapes and later analyzed at MIT.
The analysis focussed on answering the following questions:
1. How many road vehicles went through the crossing as the level crossing warning
bell started ringing?
2. How many road vehicles went through the crossing as the barrier started coming
down?
3. Were there any striking characteristics by type of road traffic?
4. How did the answers to the above questions compare across the two crossings
observed?
Before carrying out the analysis, let us look at the working of 4 typical Grade 1 level
crossing (shown in Figure 4-1) and the possible avenues for ac4idents to occur.
101
At a typical Grade 1 level crossing, the warning bell starts ringing 31 seconds
before the train reaches the crossing and continues for 4 seconds. The barrier on
the left side of the road starts coming down and is down after 6 seconds (21 seconds
before the train reaches the crossing). Now, the barrier on the right side of the road
starts coming down and is down in 6 seconds (15 seconds before the train reaches
the crossing). Any vehicles that enter the crossing before the left side barrier comes
down are not in any danger since the train is 21 seconds away from the crossing, and
they have sufficient time to get to the other side. It may so happen that the vehicle
may get stuck by the side of the crossing or its engine may stop in the event of which
an accident is possible. The working of the crossing is a function of the speed of the
trains going past the crossing. Higher speed trains need greater response times, so
the warning bell starts ringing about a minute before the train reaches the crossing.
During the level crossing site visits, we did not see any vehicles going on the wrong
side of the road (except bicycles) in around 100 instances of the descent of the barrier.
So, the likelihood of any vehicles going into the crossing as the right side barrier is
coming down is quite small, except bicycles which do go through. At a high road
traffic volume crossing, there are vehicles every few seconds. Thus, the chance of a
vehicle going into the crossing as the left side barrier is coming down reduces greatly
since there are possibly many vehicles in front of it which will stop at the warning
sign. The above arguments imply that there is a 20 second "danger interval" (the
interval when the right side barrier starts coming down till the train reaches the
crossing) when a vehicle can go into the crossing, and the risk is a function of the
vehicle headway during this interval. This notion of the "danger interval" is discussed
in the risk model presented in Section 4.3.
4.2 The Analysis
A study of the road and rail traffic volume at Crossing I shoW; s the high volume of
traffic at the crossing in the morning peak period (8.00 AM to 10.00 AM). Figure 4-2
shows the variation by type of road traffic at the crossing, where each bar shows the
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Figure 4-1: Schematic diagram of a typical Grade 1 level crossing
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number of vehicles in a particular 30 minute interval (the intervals are plotted on
the x-axis). On average, the number of automobiles at this crossing was much higher
than that of the other vehicles during this period. The rail traffic volume was also
high and trains went past the crossing every 2-3 minutes, and the barrier came down
every 2-3 minutes (Figure 4-3).
The road traffic at Crossing II has a similar pattern as Crossing I with the automobile
traffic much higher than the other types of traffic. The bicycle traffic at this crossing
was much higher than that at Crossing I. The variation by road traffic is shown in
Figure 4-4. Trains passed every 2 minutes at this crossing, and the barrier came down
every 2 minutes (Figure 4-5).
To analyze the perceived actions of the road vehicles, we attempted to answer the
following questions:
1. What is the probability that the first vehicle arriving at the crossing went
through as the warning bell was ringing?
2. What is the probability that a second vehicle went through the crossing after
the warning bell started ringing (this can happen either if the first vehicle went
through or the first vehicle stopped)?
3. What is the probability that a vehicle went through the crossing as the barrier
started coming down?
4. What is the probability that a second vehicle went through the crossing as the
barrier was coming down?
5. Were there any vehicles that went through the crossing after the barrier on the
left side of the road was down?
We answered each of the above questions by constructing probability trees to show
the chance that a vehicle went through the crossing. We also did this by type of
traffic to observe the variation in the perceived attitudes by tho type of traffic at the
crossing.
Let us first look at the actions of the road users at Crossing I.
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Figure 4-6 shows a tree to determine the probability of the first vehicle going through
the crossing as the warning bell started ringing. 60% of the first vehicles arriving at
the crossing were automobiles (and they accounted for about 57% of the total traffic).
75% of the automobiles went through as the warning bell just started ringing. The
chance that the first vehicle arriving at the crossing went through as the warning bell
was ringing is 0.86, which in any sense is not dangerous since there is sufficient time
before the barrier on the other side of the road comes down (about 9 sec) and a lot
of time before the train reaches the crossing (greater than 50 sec).
An important observation was that in 12 instances, once a vehicle stopped, say a
car or a freight truck, all the vehicles behind stopped and did not try to go by the
side of this vehicle. But bicycles did go by, irrespective of any vehicles stopped at the
crossing.
Let us now look at the likelihood that a second vehicle went through the crossing,
given that either the first vehicle had gone through the crossing or the first vehicle
had stopped.
i.e. P[Second vehicle went through the crossing] = P[Second vehicle went through
the crossing/First vehicle went through] + P[Second vehicle went through the cross-
ing/First vehicle stopped]
We observed that once the first vehicle had stopped, no other vehicles went by its side
and into the crossing. So, we take the probability of the second term in the above
equation to be zero.
Thus, the probability that we want to determine is the following:
Given that the first vehicle arriving at the crossing went through, what is the chance
that the second vehicle arriving at the crossing will go through?
We model this as a probability tree of the second vehicle going through, given that
the first vehicle has gone through. Figure 4-7 shows the tree for the second vehicle
going through the crossing as the warning bell is ringing, given that the first vehicle
has gone through. About 60% of the second vehicles coming to the crossing as the
warning bell was ringing were automobiles. 53.8% of the cars xent through, reducing
from 77% in the previous case. Thus, some cars did stop if they were the second
109
.773
Car
.227
Freight 1.0
truck
0.000
Motorcycle
1.000
Bicycle
0.000
Pedestrian
Goes through
Stops
Goes through
Stops
Goes through
Stops
Goes through
Stops
Goes through
Stops
Pr[First vehicle goes through] = 0.86
Figure 4-6: A tree to determine the chance of the first vehicle going through Crossing
I as the warning bell is ringing
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vehicle at the crossing (confirmed by observations). A significant number of bicycles
went through (85.7%). The chance that a second vehicle went through the crossing
is 0.54.
We did not model the chance of a third vehicle going through the crossing, as the
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Figure 4-7: A tree to determine the chance of a second vehicle going through Crossing
I as the warning bell is ringing
barrier started coming down by the time two vehicles went thr6ugh the crossing (the
time interval between the start of the warning bell and the descent of the barrier is 5
sec).
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We will now determine the chance that a vehicle went through the crossing as the
level crossing barrier started coming down. This is again conditional on whether the
previous vehicle had gone through the crossing or stopped, but the probability of a
vehicle going through the crossing once the barrier started coming down given that
the earlier vehicle had stopped is found to be zero. The tree is shown in Figure 4-8.
47% of the vehicles arriving at the crossing were automobiles and 31% were freight
trucks. More automobiles did not go through as the barrier started coming down
and is confirmed from observations. The chance that a vehicle went through as the
barrier started coming down is 0.30 and has significant contributions from freight
trucks, bicycles and pedestrians.
We do not determine the chance of a second vehicle going through the crossing as
the barrier is coming down, because of the reasons explained earlier.
No automobiles, freight trucks or motorcycles went through the crossing after the
crossing barrier on the left side of the road was down. Only bicycles and a few pedes-
trians went through.
The following general observations can be made from the analysis:
1. After the level crossing barrier started coming down, no vehicles (cars, trucks
or motorcycles) went through after 1 sec since there is not enough space for the
vehicles to go through, except maybe a few bicycles.
2. A lot of vehicles went through the crossing when the level crossing warning bell
stopped ringing after the train had passed, and immediately started ringing
because another train was coming. One saw a melee of people and vehicles
making a rush to get across as they had waited for a few minutes. This situation
is dangerous, since it can lead to small vehicles like bicycles getting pushed and
consequently falling on the tracks.
We construct similar probability trees for Crossing II. Figure 4-9 shows the tree for
the first vehicle going through the crossing as the warning bell •tarts ringing. At this
crossing, the chance of the first vehicle going through is 0.96. this is higher than the
likelihood for Crossing I which had a chance of 0.86.
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Figure 4-8: A tree to determine the chance of the first vehicle going through Crossing
I as the barrier starts coming down
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The chance that a second vehicle went through the crossing as the warning bell was
ringing has two components:
P[Second vehicle went through] = P[Second vehicle went through/First vehicle went
through] + P[Second vehicle went through/First vehicle stopped]
In the above expression, the probability of the second term is not zero since some
bicycles went through the crossing even after the first vehicle (car or truck) had
stopped (this probability is found to be 0.04). Figure 4-10 shows the chance of the
second vehicle going through the crossing to be 0.69. 56% of the second vehicles
arriving at the crossing were automobiles.
Here again, we do not determine the likelihood of a third vehicle going through the
crossing because the barrier started coming down by the time this vehicle reached the
crossing.
Figure 4-11 shows the tree for a vehicle going through the crossing as the barrier
started coming down. The chance of a vehicle going through is 0.66, which is higher
than that for Crossing I (which had a likelihood of 0.30). 44% of the vehicles arriving
at the crossing were bicycles and all of them went through, giving the high likelihood.
Again, only bicycles and pedestrians went through the crossing after the barrier on
the left side of the road was down.
A comparison of the probability trees for the two crossings show that the likelihood
of a vehicle going through Crossing II is higher than that at Crossing I. A plausible
reasoning is as follows. Crossing II has a significant road gradient whereas Crossing I
has level roads leading to the crossing. Our feeling is that the vehicles at Crossing II
do not have the inclination to stop as the warning bell is ringing because they have
to accelerate significantly uphill after the train goes through. They would rather go
across the crossing with their current acceleration, if it was possible to do so. This
suggests the importance of human factors in crossing accidents. In this particular
instance, they combine with one of the level crossing attributes (road gradient) and
can lead to a dangerous situation at the crossing.
Thus, a model that can incorporate the human factors of the rdad vehicle, in addition
to the attributes of the crossing seems appropriate to contruct. We describe such a
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Figure 4-11: A tree to determine the chance of a vehicle going through Crossing II as
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model for the crossing accidents in the next section.
4.3 The Risk Model
This section describes a model to predict the safety of level crossings. It incorporates
the level crossing attributes as well as the human factors involved in level crossing
accidents. The framework of the model is taken from the report presented to the JR
East team in October, 1995 [15].
The first parameter of the model deals with the causes of the accidents at level
crossings. The accident causality analysis carried out in Section 3.4.8 shows that
accidents can be broadly classified into three main categories based on their underlying
characteristics.
1. Accidents caused due to intrusion: This includes accidents caused due to in-
trusion against the level crossing gate and clearance invasion. Here, the road
vehicle tries to stop at the level crossing, but stops too close to the tracks and is
hit by the train. This may happen because the vehicle is overspeeding and does
not stop in time, or the vehicle does not realize the existence of the crossing
or the vehicle stops correctly but it has a long projection that goes into the
crossing area.
2. Accidents caused due to ignorance: Accidents due to ignorance of warning and
side hit are included in this category. These accidents are caused when the road
vehicle either does not see the crossing or deliberately ignores the level crossing
warning and goes into the crossing and is hit by the train.
3. Accidents caused due to vehicles caught in the intersection: This category in-
cludes accidents due to wheel wreck, engine stalling and traffic congestion. The
road vehicle legally enters the crossing, but is stuck becau$e the wheels get stuck
by the side of the track, or the engine stops or the vehicle is caught because of
traffic congestion.
118
As described above, the characteristics of each type of accident is different from the
other. So, a separate model is constructed for each cause.
A parameter to account for the risk involved with each type of accident is considered.
We will describe this parameter in detail in the models.
The third parameter that we consider is related to the awareness of the crossing from
the point of view of the road and rail traffic. Low rail traffic volume crossings are
more dangerous than high rail traffic volume ones, as seen in Section 3.7.1. These
awareness factors incorporate this increased risk at low train crossings.
Finally, a calibration factor ensures that the predicted number of accidents in each
category is the same as the observed number of accidents.
The following sections analyze each of the accident categories in detail and determine
appropriate values for the various parameters of the model.
4.3.1 Accidents caused due to intrusion against the crossing
gate
The risk of an accident caused due to intrusion against the level crossing gate depends
on the probability that a vehicle arrives during the 20 second "danger interval" and
stops too close to the crossing. At very low road traffic volume crossings, the risk
is low since there are possibly no vehicles during the danger interval after which the
train goes past the crossing. As the road traffic increases, the risk increases since more
vehicles will have to stop during the danger interval. Consider, for instance, a crossing
with a traffic volume of 50 vehicles per day. Assuming that the traffic is during 20
hours of the day (i.e. there is one vehicle every 24 minutes), the probability that a
vehicle will have to stop during the danger interval (assumed to be 20 seconds) is
about 0.01 (0.33 divided by 24). Similarly, the probabilities can be computed for the
different road traffic volumes. The parameter that characterizes the risk of accidents
caused due to intrusion is referred to as the "intrusion parameter" and is summarized
in Table 4.1.
The rail awareness factor is the inverse of the rail traffic volume at the crossing.
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Thus, the awareness factor is more important at low rail traffic volume crossings. An
awareness factor for road traffic volume is not included since vehicles did make an
attempt to stop at the crossing, which is independent of road traffic volume.
Road traffic volume Intrusion parameter
0-100 0.01
100-1000 0.15
1000-5000 0.8
5000-10000 1.0
Table 4.1: Risk parameter for accidents caused due to intrusion
4.3.2 Accidents caused due to ignorance of warning
The risk of an accident caused due to ignorance of warning depends on two factors:
* The probability that the vehicle headway is greater than 20 seconds (referred
to as P[Gap]).
* The probability that a vehicle arrives during the 20 second danger interval
(referred to as P[Danger]).
In fact, the risk is proportional to the product of the two factors mentioned above
(since the two factors are independent and both of them have to happen to magnify
the risk) and the resulting parameter is referred to as the "ignorance parameter".
The probability that the vehicle headway is greater than 20 seconds is very high at
low road traffic volume crossings and falls as the traffic volume increases.
The probability that a vehicle arrives during the danger interval (which is 20 seconds)
is very low at low road traffic volumes, and increases as the road traffic volume
increases.
Table 4.2 shows the "ignorance parameter" as well as the relative contribution of the
two factors to the risk of an accident due to ignorance of warhing. The probability
that the vehicle headway is greater than 20 seconds as a function of the road traffic
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at the crossing (referred to as P[Gap]) can be determined using the theory of Poisson
processes.
Let us assume that the arrival of vehicles at a crossing follows a Poisson process (i.e.
the number of vehicles arriving at a crossing in a fixed interval of time has a Poisson
distribution with rate A). Then, the interarrival times are exponentially distributed
with mean 1/A.
Consider a crossing with a road traffic volume of 0-100 vehicles per day (with a mean
of 50 vehicles per day). If we assume that the traffic is during 20 hours of the day,
the rate A is 50/20 which is 2.5 vehicles per hour.
The interarrival time of the vehicles follows an exponential distribution with mean
1/2.5. The probability density function for the distribution is given as
fT(t) = Ae-6 t , t > 0 (4.1)
The probability that the gap between successive vehicles is greater than 20 seconds
is given by
P[T > 20] = 120 Ae-tdt (4.2)
= -[e-At] (4.3)
e-0.013 (4.4)
(4.5)
Thus, the value of P[Gap] is 1 for a road traffic volume of 50 vehicles per day. Sim-
ilarly, the values of P[Gap] can be determined for the different road traffic volumes
at the crossing.
The values for P[Danger] as a function of the road traffic volume can be determined
in a similar way as described in the previous section. The igno ance parameter is low
for the low road traffic volume crossings, rises as the traffic vol!me increases (because
P[Gap] decreases and P[Danger] increases) and finally steadies out (when P[Gap]
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Road traffic volume P[Gap] P[Danger] Ignorance parameter
0-100 1.0 0.01 0.01
100-1000 0.8 0.15 0.12
1000-5000 0.25 0.8 0.2
5000-10000 0.1 1.0 10.1
Table 4.2: Risk parameter for accidents caused due to ignorance of warning
becomes negligible and P[Danger] approaches 1). At very high road traffic volumes,
the ignorance parameter is low since a vehicle might have to stop just because there
are a few vehicles ahead of it and it is highly likely that one of them will stop at the
warning bell.
The rail awareness factor again varies inversely as the rail traffic volume at the cross-
ing. At low rail traffic volume crossings, the awareness factor is high since a vehicle
might not perceive the approach of a train. This is compounded if the road traffic is
also low. Thus, crossings with low road and rail traffic volumes have high road and
rail awareness factors. By the same token, crossings with high road traffic volume
have low awareness factors, as also crossings with high rail traffic volume.
4.3.3 Accidents caused due to vehicles caught in the cross-
ing
To reiterate, these accidents are caused due to wheel wreck, engine stalling and traffic
congestion. The vehicles legally enter the crossing (say, when the warning bell is not
ringing), but are caught in the crossing and are not able to get out in time before the
train reaches the crossing.
The risk is thus directly proportional to the road traffic volume and the rail traffic
volume at the crossing. As the road traffic volume increases, the likelihood of a vehicle
being involved in a wheel wreck, engine stalling or traffic conges ion accident increases.
As the rail traffic volume increases, the available time to get the vehicle out of the
crossing reduces thereby increasing the risk. Our presumption is that risk increases
more than linearly with road traffic volume with the possibility of congestion at high
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road traffic volume crossings (given that the mean crossing is just 3.81 m from the
nearest road intersection). Table 4.3 shows the risk parameter for accidents caused
due to the vehicles caught in the crossing. The rail awareness factor is assumed to
Road traffic volume Risk parameter
0-100 0.01
100-1000 0.1
1000-5000 0.6
5000-10000 2.5
Table 4.3: Risk parameter for accidents caused due to vehicles caught in the crossing
vary inversely with the rail traffic volume at the crossing, while there is no road
awareness factor since the vehicles are aware of the crossing and legally enter it.
4.3.4 Predicting the accident rate
Once the risk parameters for the three categories of accident causes are set up, the
accident rates are calculated using the following expression:
pi = Causei x (Awrail) x (Awuoad) x (Cali) (4.6)
where
pi: Accident rate for a group of crossings
Cause2 : Risk parameter pertaining to the different categories of accidents
Awai: Rail awareness factor
Awroad: Road awareness factor
Cali: Calibration factor
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4.3.5 Model Runs
The model is run on two sets of data:
1. Automobile accidents at Grade 1 crossings with automatic barrier but without
obstacle detector
2. Automobile accidents at Grade 1 crossings with semiautomatic automatic bar-
rier but without obstacle detector
The details of the model runs on the two data sets are presented below.
Test Run 1: Crossings with automatic barrier, but without obstacle de-
tector
Table 4.4 shows the crossings grouped on the basis of the rail and the road traffic
volume at the crossing. Table 4.5 shows the observed accidents grouped on the basis
of the rail and road traffic volume at the crossing. The accident exposure is calculated
in Table 4.6 as the product of the rail traffic volume (the midvalue for each category
of rail traffic) and the total number of crossings for the category in question.
The predicted accident rates (per million trains) for accidents caused due to
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
0-20 79 112 46 5
20-40 339 378 166 27
40-60 176 175 55 16
60-80 157 142 48 6
80-100 58 61 22 3
100-120 98 86 25 3
120-160 45 80 28 2
160-200 18 44 33 2
200-400 32 28 21 6
Table 4.4: Run 1:
ignorance of warning are calculated in
Number of crossings
Table 4.7 using the ýquation presented in
124
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000 Total
0-20 0 0 1 1 2
20-40 10 4 9 4 27
40-60 3 5 2 0 10
60-80 3 5 1 0 9
80-100 1 2 0 2 5
100-120 4 5 0 0 9
120-160 3 4 3 0 10
160-200 2 6 9 0 17
200-400 1 0 4 3 8
Total 27 31 29 10 97
Table 4.5: Run 1: Number of observed accidents
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
0-20 1.730 2.453 1.007 0.109
20-40 22.272 24.835 10.906 1.774
40-60 19.272 19.163 6.023 1.752
60-80 24.068 21.769 7.358 0.919
80-100 11.432 12.023 4.336 0.591
100-120 23.608 20.717 6.023 0.723
120-160 13.797 24.528 8.585 0.613
160-200 7.096 17.345 13.009 0.788
200-400 21.024 18.396 13.797 3.942
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Table 4.6: Run 1: Accident exposure (million trains)
Section 4.3.4. The risk parameter used in the equation is as defined in Section 4.3.2.
The rail awareness factors vary inversely as the square root of the rail traffic volume,
decreasing by a factor of 6 from the low to the high rail traffic volume crossings.
The road awareness factors decrease by a factor of 14 from the low to the high
road volumes, for reasons explained in Section 4.3.2. The calibration factor of 1.75e-4
ensures that the predicted percentage of accidents caused due to ignorance of warning
is the same as the observed percentage of accidents. The predicted accident rate (per
million trains) is the highest for crossings with low rail traffic volume and medium
road traffic volume. It reduces with increased rail traffic volume due to the decreasing
values of the rail awareness factor. The accident rate increases for medium values of
road traffic and decreases for very high traffic. The accident rate is the lowest for
crossings with very high road and rail traffic volumes, due to the low values of the
awareness factors and the ignorance parameter at these crossings.
Table 4.8 shows the predicted accident rate for accidents caused due to intrusion
against the level crossing gate. The intrusion parameters are used from Table 4.1.
The rail awareness factors are the same as explained earlier, but there is no awareness
factor for the road traffic since the vehicles did try to stop at the crossing. The
calibration factor is found to be 1.57e-6. The accident rate decreases with increased
rail traffic volume, and increases with increased road traffic volume. It is the highest
for crossings with very low rail traffic volume and very high road traffic volume, since
more vehicles have to stop at the crossing during the "danger interval". The accident
rate is the lowest for crossings with very high rail traffic volume and very low road
traffic volume.
The predicted accident rate (per million trains) for accidents due to vehicles caught
in the crossing is calculated in Table 4.9. The risk parameters used to calculate the
accident rate are taken from Table 4.3. The rail awareness factors are the same as
defined earlier. There is no road awareness factor since the vehicles legally enter the
crossing. The calibration factor is found to be 5.97e-6. The predicted accident rate
is the highest for crossings with very high road traffic.
The total predicted accident rate (per million trains) is calc Ilated in Table 4.10 as
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the sum of the predicted accident rates for accidents due to ignorance of warning
(Table 4.7), intrusion (Table 4.8) and caught in the crossing (Table 4.9). The total
accident rate decreases with increasing rail traffic volume at the crossing and increases
with increasing road traffic volume. The predicted number of accidents is obtained in
Table 4.11 by multiplying the total predicted accident rates (from Table 4.10) with
the accident exposure (from Table 4.6).
A test of goodness-of-fit is conducted to determine the fit of the model to the total
observed number of accidents (Table 4.5). Consider the null hypothesis Ho which
states that the model provides a good fit to the observed accidents. The sampling
distribution of this statistic is approximately X2 [12] with 7 degrees of freedom. The
value of X2 that is obtained for the predicted number of accidents (Table 4.11) is
13.01. Since this is less than 14.07, the value of X2.o for 7 degrees of freedom, the
null hypothesis Ho cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance. Thus, we
conclude that the model provides a reasonably good fit to the observed number of
accidents.
RTV Rail awareness Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
Risk parameter
0.01 0.12 0.2 0.1
Road awareness
0.141 0.043 0.018 0.012
0-20 0.316 0.078 0.286 0.199 0.066
20-40 0.183 0.045 0.165 0.115 0.038
40-60 0.141 0.035 0.127 0.089 0.030
60-80 0.120 0.030 0.109 0.076 0.025
80-100 0.105 0.026 0.095 0.066 0.022
100-120 0.100 0.025 0.090 0.063 0.021
120-160 0.085 0.021 0.077 0.054 0.018
160-200 0.075 0.043 0.068 0.047 0.016
200-400 0.058 0.014 0.052 0.037 0.012
Table 4.7: Run 1: Predicted accident rate (per million train ) for accidents due to
ignorance of warning
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RTV Rail awareness Road traffic voluine
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
Risk parameter
0.01 0.15 0.8 1.0
0-20 0.316 0.005 0.074 0.396 0.495
20-40 0.183 0.003 0.043 0.230 0.287
40-60 0.141 0.002 0.033 0.177 0.221
60-80 0.120 0.002 0.028 0.151 0.188
80-100 0.105 0.002 0.025 0.132 0.165
100-120 0.100 0.002 0.024 0.125 0.157
120-160 0.085 0.001 0.020 0.107 0.133
160-200 0.075 0.001 0.017 0.094 0.118
200-400 0.058 0.001 0.014 0.073 0.091
Table 4.8: Run 1: Predicted accident rate (per million trains) for accidents due to
intrusion
RTV Rail awareness Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
Risk parameter
0.01 0.1 0.6 1.0
0-20 0.316 0.019 0.190 1.130 4.714
20-40 0.183 0.011 0.110 0.655 2.730
40-60 0.141 0.008 0.084 0.505 2.103
60-80 0.120 0.007 0.072 0.430 1.790
80-100 0.105 0.006 0.063 0.376 1.566
100-120 0.100 0.006 0.060 0.358 1.492
120-160 0.085 0.005 0.051 0.304 1.268
160-200 0.075 0.004 0.045 0.269 1.119
200-400 0.058 0.003 0.035 0.208 0.865
Table 4.9: Run 1: Predicted accident rate
vehicles caught in the crossing
(per million trains for accidents due to
128
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
0-20 0.102 0.592 1.730 5.276
20-40 0.059 0.343 1.000 3.055
40-60 0.045 0.264 0.771 2.354
60-80 0.039 0.225 0.656 2.003
80-100 0.034 0.197 0.574 1.753
100-120 0.032 0.187 0.546 1.670
120-160 0.027 0.159 0.465 1.419
160-200 0.049 0.141 0.410 1.252
200-400 0.019 0.109 0.317 0.9168
Table 4.10: Run 1: Total predicted accident rate (per million trains)
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000 Total
0-20 0 1 2 1 4
20-40 1 8 11 5 25
40-60 1 5 4 4 14
60-80 1 5 5 2 13
80-100 0 2 2 1 5
100-120 1 4 3 1 9
120-160 0 4 4 1 9
160-200 0 2 5 1 8
200-400 0 2 4 4 10
Total 4 33 40 20 97
Table 4.11: Run 1: Total predicted acciden'ts
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Test Run 2: Crossings with semiautomatic automatic barrier, but without
obstacle detector
A second run of the model is carried out on crossings equipped with semiautomatic
automatic barrier, but without obstacle detector. Table 4.12 shows the total number
of crossings grouped on the basis of the road and rail traffic volume at the crossing.
Table 4.13 shows the observed accidents at the crossings. The accident exposure is
calculated in Table 4.14 as the product of the rail traffic volume at the crossing and
the total number of crossings in the category of interest.
Similar to Test Run 1, the predicted accident rate (per million trains) for accidents
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
0-20 13 28 0 7
20-40 93 163 104 25
40-60 87 127 99 33
60-80 99 179 123 28
80-100 59 87 60 6
100-120 83 85 64 6
120-160 42 71 62 7
160-200 11 41 35 5
200-400 25 41 48 8
Table 4.12: Run 2: Number of crossings
caused due to ignorance of warning are shown in Table 4.15 as the product of the
ignorance parameter, the rail and road awareness factors and the calibration factor
(2.4e-4). Again, the accident rate is the highest for crossings with low rail traffic
volume and medium road traffic volume. It is the lowest for crossings with very high
road and rail traffic volumes.
The predicted accident rate (per millon trains) for accidents caused due to intrusion
are calculated in Table 4.16. The calibration factor is found to be 1.85e-6. As before,
the accident rate is the highest for crossings with very low iail traffic volume and
very high road traffic volume. It is the lowest for crossings wiýth very high rail traffic
volume and very low road traffic volume.
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RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000 Total
0-20 1 0 0 0 1
20-40 2 4 4 0 10
40-60 1 8 5 0 14
60-80 0 5 10 4 19
80-100 1 7 4 0 12
100-120 5 4 6 2 17
120-160 1 5 6 1 13
160-200 0 1 5 1 7
200-400 2 7 5 2 16
Total 13 41 45 10 109
Table 4.13: Run 2: Number of observed accidents
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
0-20 0.285 0.613 0 0.153
20-40 6.110 10.709 6.833 1.643
40-60 9.527 13.907 10.841 3.614
60-80 15.177 27.441 18.856 4.292
80-100 11.629 17.148 11.826 1.183
100-120 19.995 20.477 15.418 1.445
120-160 12.877 21.769 19.009 2.146
160-200 4.336 16.162 13.797 1.971
200-400 16.425 26.937 31.536 5.256
Table 4.14: Run 2: Accident exposure (per million trains)
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Table 4.17 shows the predicted accident rate for accidents due to vehicles caught in
the crossing. The calibration factor is found to be 4.14e-6.
The total predicted accident rate (per million trains) is shown in Table 4.18 and the
total number of predicted accidents are calculated in Table 4.19 by multiplying the
total predicted accident rate and the accident exposure (Table 4.14).
As before, a X2 test of goodness-of-fit [12] is carried out to determine the fit of the
model to the observed accidents. The value of X2 obtained for the model is 3.37.
Since this is less than 14.07, the value of X2o.5 for 7 degrees of freedom, Ho cannot be
rejected at the 0.05 level of significance. Thus, the model provides a good fit to the
observed number of accidents.
RTV Rail awareness Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
Risk parameter
0.01 0.12 0.2 0.1
Road awareness
0.141 0.043 0.018 0.012
0-20 0.316 0.109 0.397 0.277 0.092
20-40 0.183 0.063 0.230 0.161 0.054
40-60 0.141 0.048 0.177 0.124 0.041
60-80 0.120 0.041 0.151 0.105 0.035
80-100 0.105 0.036 0.132 0.092 0.031
100-120 0.100 0.034 0.126 0.088 0.029
120-160 0.085 0.029 0.107 0.075 0.025
160-200 0.075 0.060 0.094 0.066 0.022
200-400 0.058 0.020 0.073 0.051 0.017
Table 4.15: Run 2: Predicted accident rate (per million trains)
ignorance of warning
for accidents due to
4.4 Summary
This section summarizes the main points of the chapter. Tho human factors of the
road driver are found to be a very important component of lvel crossing accidents.
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RTV Rail awareness Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
Risk parameter
0.01 0.15 0.8 1.0
0-20 0.316 0.006 0.088 0.467 0.584
20-40 0.183 0.003 0.051 0.271 0.338
40-60 0.141 0.003 0.039 0.209 0.261
60-80 0.120 0.002 0.033 0.177 0.222
80-100 0.105 0.002 0.029 0.155 0.194
100-120 0.100 0.002 0.028 0.148 0.185
120-160 0.085 0.002 0.024 0.126 0.157
160-200 0.075 0.001 0.021 0.111 0.139
200-400 0.058 0.001 0.016 0.086 0.107
Table 4.16: Run 2: Predicted accident rate (per million trains) for accidents due to
intrusion
RTV Rail awareness Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
Risk parameter
0.01 0.1 0.6 1.0
0-20 0.316 0.010 0.101 0.604 2.515
20-40 0.183 0.006 0.058 0.350 1.456
40-60 0.141 0.005 0.045 0.269 1.122
60-80 0.120 0.004 0.038 0.229 0.955
80-100 0.105 0.003 0.033 0.201 0.836
100-120 0.100 0.003 0.032 0.191 0.800
120-160 0.085 0.003 0.027 0.162 0.678
160-200 0.075 0.002 0.024 0.143 0.600
200-400 0.058 0.002 0.019 0.111 0.462
Table 4.17: Run 2: Predicted accident rate
vehicles caught in the crossing
(per million train ) for accidents due to
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RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000
0-20 0.124 0.586 1.350 3.192
20-40 0.072 0.339 0.781 1.848
40-60 0.056 0.261 0.602 1.424
60-80 0.047 0.222 0.512 1.212
80-100 0.041 0.195 0.448 1.060
100-120 0.039 0.185 0.427 1.010
120-160 0.034 0.158 0.363 0.859
160-200 0.064 0.139 0.320 0.758
200-400 0.023 0.107 0.247 0.586
Table 4.18: Run 2: Total predicted accident rate (per million trains)
RTV Road traffic volume
0-100 100-1000 1000-5000 5000-10000 Total
0-20 0 0 0 1 1
20-40 0 4 5 3 12
40-60 1 4 7 5 17
60-80 1 6 10 5 22
80-100 1 3 5 1 10
100-120 1 4 7 1 13
120-160 0 3 7 2 12
160-200 0 2 4 2 8
200-400 0 3 8 3 14
Total 4 29 53 23 109
Table 4.19: Run 2: Total predicted accideits
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Accidents that are caused due to intrusion against the level crossing gate and igno-
rance of warning have an inherent contribution from the human factors of the driver.
These are the accidents that cannot be reduced by the obstacle detector. A few level
crossings are analyzed to gather valuable information about the perceived actions of
the road users at the crossing. These actions relate to the way in which the vehicles
behave in response to the various safety devices at the crossing (warning bell and
flasher and the descent of the level crossing barrier). The following conclusions can
be drawn from the analysis:
1. Most vehicles go through the crossing if they are the first vehicle at the crossing
when the warning bell just starts ringing.
2. Fewer vehicles go through the crossing if they are the second vehicle at the
crossing when the warning bell is ringing.
3. Most automobiles stop at the crossing when the level crossing barrier starts
coming down. But, bicycles and pedestrians do go through the crossing, even
when the barrier is coming down.
4. A few bicycles go through the crossing after the barrier on the left side of the
road is down (Figure 4-1).
5. Most vehicles stopped at the crossing go through when the warning bell stops
ringing after the train has passed, and immediately starts ringing because an-
other train is approaching the crossing.
6. The interaction between the level crossing attributes and the human factors of
the road driver is a crucial component of level crossing accidents.
A model that captures this interaction between the crossing attributes and the human
factors is presented. It considers four factors:
1. Causality parameter: This parameter captures the hun an factors of the road
user for three main categories of accidents: intrusion, ignorance and caught in
the crossing. The underlying human factors in each typd of accident is different
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from the other and is captured by a "risk parameter" defined for each of the
three accident causes.
2. Rail awareness factor: This parameter accounts for the awareness of the crossing
from the point of view of the rail traffic at the crossing.
3. Road awareness factor: This parameter considers the awareness of the crossing
as seen from the road vehicle. Low road traffic volume crossings have a higher
awareness factor compared to high road traffic volume crossings.
4. Calibration factor: This parameter is used to calibrate the model.
The details of the model runs are presented in Section 4.3. The results show that the
model provides a very good prediction of the observed accidents (as shown by the X2
test of goodness-of-fit).
Though we have run the model for automobile accidents at Grade 1 crossings without
obstacle detectors (the largest category of accidents), it can also be run on the other
categories of accidents by type of road traffic. The performance of the model for a
set of values of the "risk parameter" can also be tried out.
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Chapter 5
Risk Management of Level
Crossings
5.1 Limited resources for safety
In Section 2.5, we touched upon the notion that there are always limited resources
available for spending on safety. There is no doubt that safety is one of the main
concerns of modern societies, but resources need to be allocated for other public
services as well. Thus, the question that is posed is the following: given the limited
amount of resources available for safety, how should the allocation be carried out
such that we achieve the maximum possible benefit? In the context of level crossing
safety, the benefit can be interpreted as the reduction in the monetary collective risk
Rm with a finite investment in safety measures.
5.2 The Methodology
We use a simple benefit-cost approach to determine the allocation of resources for risk
reduction. This approach is equivalent to the marginal cost criterion that we derived
in Section 2.5 as the condition for the optimal investment in safety. The procedure
for the optimal allocation is as follows:
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1. Determine the accident rate (per year) for each attribute of the level crossing.
2. Find the incremental reduction in accident rate (per year) Ap in going to a
higher level of safety.
3. Find the incremental cost (million yen per year) Ac incurred in upgrading to
the next level of safety.
4. Find the ratio of the incremental reduction in accident rate to the incremental
cost of the safety measure Ap/Ac.
5. Multiply this ratio by the expected consequences (million yen) of an accident.
This gives the incremental reduction in the monetary collective risk (million yen
per year) to the-incremental cost of the safety measure (million yen per year)
ARm/Ac.
6. If ARm/Ac is greater than 1, the application of that safety measure is justified
since it results in a greater reduction in risk than its installation cost.
The methodology was developed by Carl Martland and presented to the JR East
team in October, 1995 [15]. It is now applied to different attributes of the crossing
and the efficacy of the various safety measures are discussed. The analysis is then
extended to the development of a Risk Management Plan for level crossing safety.
Finally, a set of suggestions are presented to JR East.
5.3 Application to level crossing attributes
The methodology discussed in the previous section is applied to the following at-
tributes of the crossings:
1. Type of safety device
* Grade 4 crossing, with neither a warning system n(r a barrier
* Grade 3 crossing, with a warning system but no barrier
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. Grade 1 crossing, with a warning system and barrier
* Grade 1 crossing with obstacle detector
* Grade separated crossing
2. Crossings by visibility of the crossing
3. Crossings by road gradient of the crossing
The initial and annual costs of the various attributes are indicated in Table 5.1. The
initial estimates were provided by the Safety Research Laboratory of JR East. We
assume the equivalent uniform annual cost of a safety device to be 10% of its total
cost and the maintenance cost to be 5% of the total cost to calculate the total annual
cost of a safety device (assuming its life is 20 years). The following legends are used
in the analyses shown below:
* G4: Grade 4 crossing
* G3: Grade 3 crossing
* GI: Grade 1 crossing
* G1+O.d: Grade 1 crossing equipped with an obstacle detector
* G.s: Grade separated crossing
Upgrade Initial cost (million yen) Annual cost (million yen)
G4 - G3 11 1.65
G3 - G1 8 1.2
G4 -+ G1 <19 <2.85
Obstacle detector 17 2.55
Alarm button 0.4 for 2 devices 0.06
Overhang warning device 3.4 for 2 devices 0.51
Big barrier 0.2 for 2 barriers 0.03
Grade separation 100 10
Table 5.1: Costs of the various safety upgrades
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The accident rate (per million trains) by the rail traffic volume at the crossing is shown
in Table 5.2 [15]. The expected consequences per accident w is shown in Table 5.3 as
a function of the rail traffic volume.
RTV G.s G1+O.d G1 G3 G4
10 0 1.240 1.810 3.620 7.240
30 0 0.790 1.780 3.560 7.120
50 0 0.670 1.960 3.920 7.840
70 0 0.610 2.140 4.280 8.560
90 0 0.580 2.310 4.620 9.240
110 0 0.570 2.480 4.960 9.920
130 0 0.540 2.500 5.000 10.000
150 0 0.470 2.600 5.200 10.400
170 0 0.460 2.500 5.000 10.000
190 0 0.450 2.400 4.800 9.600
210 0 0.440 2.300 4.600 9.200
230 0 0.430 2.200 4.400 8.800
250 0 0.420 2.100 4.200 8.400
Table 5.2: Accident rate (per million trains) by rail traffic volume
RTV Automobile Freight truck Motorcycle Bicycle Pedestrian
10 5 3 10 10 10
30 10 5 15 15 15
50 15 10 18 18 18
70 20 16 20 20 20
90 25 23 23 23 23
110 30 30 26 26 26
130 35 36 29 29 29
150 40 42 32 32 32
170 45 48 35 35 35
190 50 56 38 38 38
210 65 64 51 51 51
230 70 80 54 54 54
250 80 100 62 6ý 62
yen) by rail traffic volume
140
Table 5.3: Expected consequences per accident (million
5.3.1 Safety devices
The benefit-cost approach is carried out to determine the efficacy of the various level
crossing safety devices. The approach is illustrated for two categories of rail traffic
volume.
1. Low rail traffic volume crossings (30 trains per day).
2. High rail traffic volume crossings (150 trains per day).
A comparison between the two categories of rail traffic volume is carried out in terms
of the type of safety device as a function of rail traffic volume. Sensitivity analyses is
performed by varying the value of life estimates discussed in Section 3.5.2.
Low rail traffic volume crossings (30 trains per day)
Table 5.4 shows the benefit-cost analysis for crossings having a rail traffic volume of
30 trains per day. These crossings have a low volume of road traffic going across, since
a lot of these crossings are located in rural areas. The first column in the table shows
Upgrade Pi P2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac wt Al ,/Ac
G4 -+ G3 0.078 0.039 0.039 1.65 0.024 60 1.44
G3 -+ G1 0.039 0.020 0.019 1.20 0.016 60 0.96
G1 -- Gl+O.d 0.020 0.009 0.011 2.55 0.004 60 0.26
Gl+O.d -+ G.s 0.009 0.000 0.009 10 9.0e-4 60 0.054
Table 5.4: Benefit-cost analysis for low rail traffic volume crossings
the upgrade to a higher level of safety at the crossing. The second and third columns
show the accident rate (per year) for the upgrades being considered (obtained from
Table 5.2). These are obtained by multiplying the accident rate (per million trains)
by the accident exposure as defined in Section 4.3. The fo4rth column shows the
incremental reduction in the accident rate (per year) Ap in. moving to the higher
level of safety. The fifth column shows the incremental cost (njillion yen per year) Ac
of the upgrade (from Table 5.1). The sixth column shows the tatio of the incremental
reduction in accident rate to the incremental cost Ap/Ac. Thý seventh column shows
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the expected consequences per accident (million yen) w for the road traffic at the
crossing (Table 5.3). The expected consequences implicitly assumes a value of life
equal to 100 million yen. The eighth column shows the incremental reduction in the
monetary collective risk to the incremental cost ARm/Ac.
The analysis justifies the upgrade of a Grade 4 crossing to a Grade 3 crossing and a
Grade 3 crossing to a Grade 1 crossing (both the upgrades have ARm/Ac greater than
1). Earlier, we saw in Section 3.5.1 that low rail traffic volume crossings have high
accident rates. The above analysis justifies this finding and advocates an increase in
the level of safety at these crossings. The installation of an obstacle detector is not
justified since these crossings have a low volume of road traffic and have few accidents
due to vehicles caught in the crossing.
High rail traffic volume crossings (150 trains per day)
The benefit-cost analysis is done for crossings having a rail traffic volume of 150 trains
per day. These crossings have a large amount of road traffic going through everyday.
Table 5.5 shows the analysis. Here, the incremental costs Ac of the various safety
measures are the same as Table 5.4, but the incremental reduction in the accident
rate (per year) Ap is higher due to the increased accident exposure.
The upgrades of a Grade 4 crossing to a Grade 3 crossing and a Grade 3 crossing
to a Grade 1 crossing are clearly justified. These crossings have a large amount of
rail traffic going across every day. This calls for increased safety at these crossings,
as the likelihood of accidents due to ignorance of warning and vehicles caught in the
crossing increases. The installation of the obstacle detector is clearly justified at these
crossings, but grade separation cannot be justified only on the basis of safety.
Upgrade Pi P2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac
G4 -+ G3 0.570 0.285 0.285 1.65 0.173
G3 -+ G1 0.285 0.143 0.142 1.20 0.118
G1 -+ Gl+O.d 0.143 0.026 0.117 2.55 0.046
G1+O.d -+ G.s 0.026 0.000 0.026 10 2.6e-3
Table 5.5: Benefit-cost analysis for high rail traffic vo
w ARm/Ac
178 30.75
178 21.06
178 8.17
178 0.46
lume crossings
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Sensitivity analyses
In the previous section, the benefit-cost analysis for the efficacy of the various level
crossing safety devices was carried out assuming a value of life equal to 100 million
yen. The value of life estimates discussed in Section 3.5.2 show considerable diffusion
based on the methodology used to compute the estimate and the cultural background
in different countries. Thus, it seems appropriate to test the cost-benefit approach
with different estimates of the value of life. We use two additional estimates addressed
in Section 3.5.2 to carry out the sensitivity analyses.
Analysis I: Value of life estimate of 260 million yen
The analysis is the same as shown in Table 5.4 except that the expected consequences
per accident are scaled up by a value of 2.6 to reflect the increased value of life es-
timate. This is illustrated for both the categories of rail traffic volume mentioned
earlier.
Low rail traffic volume crossings (30 trains per day)
Table 5.6 shows the results of the benefit-cost analysis. As before, the upgrade of a
Grade 4 crossing to a Grade 3 crossing and a Grade 3 crossing to a Grade 1 crossing
are clearly justified for reasons mentioned earlier. Even the higher estimate of the
value of life does not justify the installation of the obstacle detector at low rail traffic
volume crossings.
High rail traffic volume crossings (150 trains per day)
Upgrade Pi P2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w ARm/Ac
G4 -± G3 0.078 0.039 0.039 1.65 0.024 156 3.74
G3 -+ Gi 0.039 0.020 0.019 1.20 0.016 156 2.50
G1 -- G1+O.d 0.020 0.009 0.011 2.55 0.004 156 0.62
Gl+O.d -+ G.s 0.009 0.000 0.009 10 9.0e-4 156 0.14
Table 5.6: Analysis I: Benefit-cost analysis for low rail traffic volume crossings
Table 5.7 shows the benefit-cost analysis for crossings with a r il traffic volume of 150
trains per day. As before, the results justify the upgrade of a Grade 4 crossing to a
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Grade 3 crossing, a Grade 3 crossing to a Grade 1 crossing arnd a Grade 1 crossing
to that with a detector. The high estimate of the value of life does justify grade
separation and the railroad and the city will benefit in terms of faster trains and less
congestion, but a potential problem can be that the cost of grade separation may be
more than 10 million yen per year (as shown in Table 5.7) at certain locations.
Upgrade pl p2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w ARm/Ac
G4 - G3 0.570 0.285 0.285 1.65 0.173 463 80.10
G3 -+ G1 0.285 0.143 0.142 1.20 0.118 463 54.63
G1 - G1+O.d 0.143 0.026 0.117 2.55 0.046 463 21.30
G1+O.d -+ G.s 0.026 0.000 0.026 10 2.6e-3 463 1.20
Table 5.7: Analysis I: Benefit-cost analysis for high rail traffic volume crossings
Analysis II: Value of life estimate of 25.6 million yen
JR East suggests a value of life of 25.6 million yen [16]. The cost-benefit analysis is
carried out for this estimate of the value of life.
Low rail traffic volume crossings (30 trains per day)
Table 5.8 shows the results of the analysis for crossings having a rail traffic volume
of 30 trains per day. None of the upgrades are justified with this low estimate of the
value of life.
High rail traffic volume crossings (150 trains per day)
Upgrade Pi P2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w ARm/Ac
G4 -+ G3 0.078 0.039 0.039 1.65 0.024 15 0.36
G3 -+ G1 0.039 0.020 0.019 1.20 0.016 15 0.24
G1 -÷ Gl+O.d 0.020 0.009 0.011 2.55 0.004 15 0.06
G1+O.d -+ G.s 0.009 0.000 0.009 10 9.0e-4 15 0.01
Table 5.8: Analysis II: Benefit-cost analysis for low rail tra c volume cross s
The benefit-cost analysis is carried out for crossings with a ra
trains per day and is shown in Table 5.9. Even with this lowe
il traffic volume of 150
r estimate of the value
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I
ie upgrades of a Grade 4 crossing to a Grade 3 crossing, a Grade 3 crossing
,de 1 crossing and a Grade 1 crossing to that with an obstacle detector are
ified.
he sensitivity analyses show that the ratios of ARm/Ac are sensitive to the
'pgrade Pi P2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w ARm/Ac
14 - G3 0.570 0.285 0.285 1.65 0.173 46 7.96
13 -+ G1 0.285 0.143 0.142 1.20 0.118 46 5.43
T1 - G1+O.d 0.143 0.026 0.117 2.55 0.046 46 2.12
11+O.d -- G.s 0.026 0.000 0.026 10 2.6e-3 46 0.12
5.9: Analysis II: Benefit-cost analysis for high rail traffic volume crossings
estimates of the value of life. At low rail traffic volume crossings, the values
.ed by JR East do not justify the upgrades of any of the crossings. But the
3 are justified with median and high estimates of the value of life. We again
e preliminary nature of the value of life estimates (Section 3.5.2). JR East
pdate the estimates based on the current perceptions of safety in Japan and
t the benefit-cost analyses based on these estimates.
Visibility
efit-cost methodology is applied to evaluate the efficacy of improving crossings
visibility (defined as the minimum distance from which the road driver can
crossing). Section 3.7.1 discussed the accident rate (per million trains) as
m of visibility of the crossing and concluded that the accident rate is higher
ings with less than 20m visibility than for crossings with greater than 20m
bility crossings can be improved by installing signs by the side of the road or
the road surface indicating that there is a crossing ahad. These are low cost
3 and we presume that the cost of signage and paintiigi for a single crossing
yen per year.
10 shows the benefit-cost analysis for four f rail traffic volume.
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The first column shows the rail traffic volume at the crossing. The second and third
columns show the accident rates (per year) for the upgrades being considered and are
obtained from Table 3.21 by multiplying the accident rate (per million trains) by the
accident exposure. The fourth column shows the incremental reduction in accident
rate (per year) Ap as the visibility of the crossing improves. The fifth column shows
the incremental cost (million yen per year) Ac. The ratio Ap/Ac is calculated in the
sixth column. The expected consequences per accident w obtained from Table 5.3
(assuming a value of life equal to 100 million yen) is shown in the seventh column.
Finally, the ratio of the incremental reduction in the monetary collective risk to the
cost ARmn/Ac is shown in the eighth column.
The visibility improvements are clearly justified for all categories of rail traffic volume
RTV Pi P2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w ARm/Ac
0-40 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.05 0.04 49 1.96
40-80 0.016 0.012 0.004 0.05 0.08 88 7.04
80-120 0.020 0.011 0.009 0.05 0.18 128 23.04
120-160 0.022 0.018 0.004 0.05 0.08 168 13.44
Table 5.10: Benefit-cost analysis for visibility of the crossing
based on the values of ARm/Ac (greater than 1).
5.3.3 Road gradient
Section 3.7.2 showed the variation in the accident rate (per million trains) with the
road gradient at the crossing. Crossings with a level gradient had a lower accident
rate than crossings with an upward or downward gradient, but the difference in the
accident rates was not statistically significant.
Crossings with a gradient can be made safer by roughening the surface of the roads
leading to the crossing. Presuming that the cost of roughhning for one crossing
is 50,000 yen per year, the benefit-cost analysis is carried out in Table 5.11. The
values for the incremental reduction in accident rate (per year i Ap are obtained from
Table 3.23 by multiplying the incremental reduction in accident rate (per million
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trains) by the accident exposure. Again, the expected consequences per accident are
obtained from Table 5.3.
The analysis clearly justifies the investment in improving crossings with significant
road gradient leading to the crossing.
RTV pi P2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w A Rm/ Ac
0-40 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.05 0.02 49 0.98
40-80 0.006 0.014 0.008 0.05 0.16 88 14.08
80-120 0.009 0.013 0.004 0.05 0.08 128 10.24
U ____..____ ___ 1____1____J_____.1_ ________
Table 5.11: Benefit-cost analysis for road gradient of the crossing
5.4 Risk Management Plan
The probabilistic risk assessment methodology has been applied to level crossing ac-
cidents on the JR East network. The risk analysis yielded the accident rate and the
monetary collective risk Rm for level crossings with different attributes such as vis-
ibility, road gradient and presence or absence of safety devices at the crossing. The
notion of perceived risk was recognized as a key aspect of the analysis and was quanti-
fied by adding weights (risk conversion factors) to the consequences of the accidents.
The cost-benefit analysis looked at the efficacy of the various level crossing safety
measures in reducing the risk of crossing accidents, given the limited availability of
resources. The three components of the risk assessment methodology need to be tied
together into a comprehensive action plan for level crossing safety that can be referred
to as the Risk Management Plan.
The Risk Management Plan is an action oriented decision making tool for level cross-
ing safety. It allocates available resources among competing safety measures, keeping
in mind the accident scenario(s) addressed by each safety moasure and the organi-
zation(s) responsible for the implementation of the safety nreasures. A schematic
diagram of the Risk Management Plan is shown in Figure 5-1. The left panel of the
Plan shows the investment among competing safety measures. The right panel shows
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the organization(s) that are responsible for implementing each of the safety measures.
The plan does not explicitly show the accident scenario(s) ad ressed by each of the
safety measures, but a discussion of the scenarios is presented below along with the
role of the various organizations.
5.4.1 Components of the Risk Management Plan
As mentioned in the previous section, the Risk Management Plan for level crossing
safety has three main components: investment among the various safety measures,
the accident scenario(s) that each safety measure addresses and the organization(s)
responsible for implementing the safety measures. The interaction between the three
components is complex and needs to be thoroughly understood before decisions are
made for investment in level crossing safety. The competing measures are:
1. Safety measures at level crossings
* Low cost measures
* Medium cost measures
* High cost measures
2. Enforcement at level crossings
3. Education and media campaigns
A brief discussion of each of the measures is presented below.
Level crossing safety measures
Various safety measures can be installed to reduce the risk of level crossing accidents.
These range from relatively inexpensive measures like signage and painting the surface
of roads to medium cost measures like installing alarm button and overhang warning
signs to more expensive investments in level crossing barriers, obstacle detectors and
grade separation.
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5-1: Schematic diagram of the Risk Management Plan
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Low cost measures
The low cost measures address level crossing accidents caused due to low visibility
of the crossing and significant downward gradient of the road leading to the crossing
(resulting in the vehicle slipping at the crossing).
Low visibility crossings can be made safer by installing signs by the side of the road
indicating the presence of a crossing ahead, or the surface of the road leading to the
crossing can be painted to warn the vehicle about the existence of a crossing. The
signs can be made fluorescent to ensure increased visibility of the crossings during
night time. The benefit-cost analysis shown in Section 5.3.2 justifies the use of these
signs to improve the visibility at concerned crossings.
If crossings have a significant downward road gradient leading to the crossing, the
surface of the road can be roughened to prevent slipping of the vehicle (as seen at
Kuki crossing during the level crossing site visits). The benefit-cost analysis (Sec-
tion 5.3.3) justifies this safety investment since the reduction in the risk is more than
the cost of the safety investment.
The success of the low cost safety measures depends considerably on the cooperation
between JR East and the road authorities. Any institutional barriers, if present,
should be discussed and resolved so that these low cost effective measures are imple-
mented at dangerous crossings.
Medium cost measures
Some of the medium cost measures include the installation of alarm buttons at cross-
ings to act as an aid to obstacle detectors and overhang warning devices at low
visibility crossings and also to reduce accidents due to side hit by making the cross-
ing more visible to the road driver.
Alarm buttons are normally installed at Grade 1 crossings equipped with obstacle
detectors to act as an aid to the detector in the event of an qmergency. If a vehicle
is in the middle of the crossing, a third party person can op rate the button which
activates the railroad signalling system thereby alerting the train driver of the sit-
uation at the crossing. In some instances, the consequences of the accident can be
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reduced even if the train driver did not have enough time to stop the train before
it reached the crossing (if the obstacle detector did not have enough time to warn
the train driver and someone operated the alarm button). Even though we cannot
exactly quantify the benefits of the alarm button due to the di$fculty associated with
isolating its efficacy with other safety devices, we believe that it has potential benefits
at dangerous crossings. JR East can educate people about the operation of the alarm
button in emergency situations and include it as a part of its campaign towards level
crossing safety.
Overhang warning devices increase the visibility at low visibility crossings by alerting
the vehicle about the existence of a crossing. They can also prevent side hit accidents
by warning the unaware driver of the presence of a crossing. At present, only a few
crossings have these warning devices. JR East can identify potential crossings for
installing warning devices based on the risk cost criterion. These devices have poten-
tial benefits at dangerous crossings, but their installment should be justified against
competing measures based on the benefit-cost criterion discussed earlier.
High cost measures
Upgrading crossings with barriers, installing obstacle detectors and grade separating
crossings constitute the high cost safety measures at level crossings.
The analysis in Section 3.7.3 shows that Grade 1 crossings are safer than Grade 3 and
Grade 4 crossings. Level crossing barriers reduce the number of illegal crossings, and
hence reduce accidents due to intrusion and ignorance of warning. The probability
trees constructed in Section 4.1 show that most automobiles do not attempt to go
through the crossing when the barrier is coming down. But, all crossings cannot be
made Grade 1 due to the limited availability of resources. Section 5.3.1 addresses
the efficacy of upgrading Grade 3 and Grade 4 crossings to Grade 1 crossings as a
function of rail traffic volume at the crossing and the estim tes of the value of life
for the consequences of the accidents. JR East should upgra e dangerous crossings
based on this risk-cost criterion.
Obstacle detectors are very effective in reducing accidents du e to vehicles caught in
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the crossing, i.e. wheel wreck, engine stalling and traffic congestion. But, they can-
not be installed at all crossings. The benefit-cost analysis in Section 5.3.1 shows the
potential benefits of installing a detector with respect to the rail traffic volume at the
crossing. Thus, JR East should weigh the costs and benefits of installing the detector
and identify potential crossings for improvement based on the risk-cost criterion.
Though grade separation is a very expensive option, it may become necessary at very
high rail traffic volume crossings in urban areas. Some of the crossings in Tokyo
have a high volume of rail traffic going across and it may become inevitable to grade
separate to reduce the accident exposure at these crossings. JR East should carry
out a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether certain crossings should be grade
separated. But, it needs sustained cooperation with the highway authorities and the
local government to resolve barriers to successfully implement the upgrade.
Enforcement at level crossings
Strict enforcement by authorities is a key component of level crossing safety. Enforce-
ment addresses illegal crossings by the road vehicle (intrusion against the crossing
gate, ignorance of warning and impossible traversing). The added importance of en-
forcement measures comes from the fact that 53% of the level crossing accidents have
resulted from intrusion and ignorance of warning (Section 3.4.8) and these accidents
cannot be prevented by the obstacle detector. Enforcement by itself, though, is not
very efficient since a number of level crossing accidents on the JR East network have
occurred due to ignorance of warning even though a fine of 10,000 yen is levied on
trespassers at crossings. Enforcement coupled with education campaigns is very ef-
fective in reducing crossing accidents, as demonstrated by Operation Lifesaver in the
United States, and is discussed in the next section. The success of strict enforcement
warrants the cooperation between JR East and the police to coordinate successfully
in irn Inimi nftin cr rncwfil 1 p u rr nc+ Illww~l pinr c M - ovrrro Q I
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Education and media campaigns
Education campaigns are found to be very effective in reducii g crossing accidents.
Operation Lifesaver has been doing a tremendous job in the United States in edu-
cating and warning the public about the danger of illegal crossings. It coordinates
its activities with enforcement officials and helps in apprehending trespassers at level
crossings.
Operation Lifesaver demonstrates the potential benefits of education campaigns in
reducing crossing accidents. In 1993, Operation Lifesaver received $2,500 to $50,000
in a few states in the United States [21]. The GAO report [21] highlights the success
of the Operation Lifesaver program in Ohio.
"Our review of a state with an active education and enforcement program -Ohio-
found that the state had reduced accidents at crossings with active warning devices
from 377 in 1978 to 93 in 1993-a 75-percent decline."
"Ohio demonstrates how states with a relatively high number of accidents can suc-
cessfully use education and enforcement programs to improve railroad crossing safety.
Ohio's Operation Lifesaver was established in 1978 in an attempt to employ educa-
tional events and enhanced law enforcement as a means to reduce railroad crossing
accidents and fatalities. The program has a full-time coordinator and 280 volunteers.
Its education and enforcement efforts have helped Ohio reduce accidents at railroad
crossings, especially those with active warning devices."
Thus, education campaigns are very effective in tutoring the public about the dangers
of illegal crossing and are feasible from a risk-cost criterion.
JR East should advocate its education campaigns on the lines of Operation Lifesaver.
The campaigns should address the following issues:
1. The company should educate the public about the causes and characteristics
of the various level crossing accidents. Accidents due to illegal crossings such
as intrusion against the gate and ignorance of warning should be highlighted
and the dangers of such crossings discussed because th se accidents cannot be
prevented by the obstacle detector. The presence of si ns (painting the road
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surface) at low visibility crossings should be emphasized so that vehicles are
not caught unaware and side hit accidents can be reduced. Accidents due to
vehicles caught in the crossing such as wheel wreck, engine stalling and traffic
congestion should be discussed either as media announcements or company
hoardings, even though such accidents occur due to no fault of the road driver
or they can be prevented by the obstacle detector. Drivers should be warned
particularly against traffic congestion accidents, especially during peak periods.
2. As part of the campaigns, JR East should make known the presence of safety
devices such as alarm buttons to the public and teach the use of the same. The
consequences of certain accidents can be minimized by the use of the button,
even though the accident cannot be prevented by the obstacle detector.
The public should be encouraged to report malfunctions of level crossing safety
equipment to the company so that they can be rectified before anything unto-
ward happens.
3. Perhaps, the most important value of the campaigns is to inform the public
about the perceived actions of the vehicles at the crossing. We believe that
this is a very important component of the crossing accidents and educating the
public about driving behavior will make them more conscious in the future. The
following are a few points that can be highlighted in the campaigns:
* Most vehicles stopped at the crossing go through when the level crossing
warning bell stops ringing after the train goes past and immediately starts
ringing as another train is approaching the crossing. This is a dangerous
situation since it can result in small vehicles like bicycles and pedestrians
stumbling and falling on the tracks.
* A lot of bicycles and pedestrians go through the crossing even after the
barrier on the left side of the road is down (Fig re 4-1). If something
untoward happens now, it increases the likelihood of an accident since
there is little recovery time to get out of the cross ng. Most automobiles
stop at the crossing when the barrier starts comin down.
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* A lot of bicycles are on the wrong side of the road when they approach
the crossing. As the warning bell is ringing, they go past the right barrier
but the left barrier is almost down when they reacl the other side of the
crossing (Figure 4-1). So, they have to go round the gate. This leads to a
dangerous situation as they might get caught in the crossing, or might fall
on the tracks.
* 22% of the accidents have occurred when the vehicle goes into the crossing
as the bell is ringing, but has been unable to come out on the other side
as something went wrong when the vehicle was in the crossing. Vehicles
should stop when the warning bell starts ringing.
* Vehicles should be aware of accidents due to traffic congestion. The mean
crossing is just 3.81 m from the nearest road intersection, which is less
than the length of a single car (about 5 m). Vehicles should not stop on
crossing tracks when waiting at a red light. This is especially important
during peak hour traffic as trains arrive every few rminutes at crossings.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary of the thesis
This thesis analyzes level crossing accidents on JR East using the techniques of prob-
abilistic risk assessment. The research is part of an ongoing project between MIT and
JR East in the area of risk assessment. Level crossing accidents are not a common
occurrence on the JR East network. A total of 927 accidents have occurred on the
7,894 crossings from April, 1987 to March, 1993. The remaining part of this section
summarizes the work done in this thesis.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to level crossing safety. The research on level
crossing safety as a part of the overall risk assessment project is presented. The
Safety Research Laboratory of JR East has a group which primarily works on cross-
ing safety. They look at potential crossings that can be upgraded by installing safety
devices at the crossings. They also develop computer models to simulate possible
accident scenarios so that ameliorating measures can be taken before accidents occur
at dangerous crossings.
A brief discussion of level crossing safety in the US is presented. Empirical techniques
to predict the safety of level crossings is discussed in the coittext of currently used
accident prediction formulas. Engineering and educational st/ ategies to upgrade the
safety of crossings is discussed.
A detailed discussion of the risk assessment methodology is resented in Chapter 2.
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In general, risk is the product of the probability of occurrence of an event and its con-
sequences, whether they be positive or negative. The risk assessment methodology
poses the following two questions to determine the safety of a echnical system such
as a transportation system: (i) What can happen? (ii) What is acceptable? The first
question refers to risk analysis which is the technical component of risk assessment
and evaluates risk using techniques from engineering and probability theory. It is
also important to distinguish the three notions of risk depending on the perspectives
being considered: individual risk, societal risk and the company responsible for the
risk. Individual risk is the probability that an individual assigns to he being involved
in a risky activity. But, society is concerned about the safety of all individuals. Thus,
societal risk refers to the total risk of all the individuals in the society. The company
is concerned about the occurrence of catastrophic accidents which has large conse-
quences. The second question refers to risk appraisal and involves value judgments
on the part of the team conducting the risk assessment study. Society perceives risk
in a way that is sometimes not conformable with reality. This relates to the issue of
acceptability of risk and the way in which information about; risk is communicated
to society. Finally, resources need to be allocated for investments in safety. The
available resources are limited so the investments should be such that the benefits
outweigh the costs of the investments. The criterion for the optimum investment level
is as follows:
1. Identify all the safety measures that can be applied to the, system. These include
both individual safety measures as well as their possible combinations.
2. Determine the cost and benefit of each safety measure (and their possible com-
binations).
3. The safety measures (and their possible combinations) are plotted as individual
points on a risk-cost diagram (as shown in Figure 6-1).
4. The optimal risk reduction curve is drawn by connecti g all the points which
yield the largest reduction in risk for all possible values of the cost.
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RFigure 6-1: Optimal risk reduction investment
for analyzing the level crossing accidents on the JR East network.
ed on two databases that JR East maintains with respect to level
e Level Crossing Database and The Accident Database. The Level
is extremely detailed in its description of the crossings and has
'ach of the crossings. Some of the important attributes are the
at the crossing, road traffic volume, level of safety at the crossing,
ossing from the point of view of the road driver, road gradient,
ssing and width of the crossing. The Level Crossing Database is
A. Let us now define some of the attributes of the crossings.
rade: This refers to the level of safety at the crossing. There are
[es:
is crossing is equipped with a warning sys
warning system consists of a warning bell
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there are 2 barriers on either side of the crossing. Figure 6-2 shows the func-
tioning of a typical Grade 1 crossing.
2. Grade 3: This crossing is equipped only with a warning system.
3. Grade 4: This crossing has only a level crossing sign.
Gate mechanism: There are mainly two types of crossing barriers on the JR East
network.
1. Automatic barrier: This barrier operates automatically and is connected to the
train detection system. When the approaching train is detected, the barrier
starts coming down and is down before the train reaches: the crossing.
2. Semiautomatic-automatic barrier: These barriers are installed in station areas
so that they can be operated automatically as well as manually. The manual
operation is usually done by the maintenance staff under the supervision of the
station master.
Obstacle detector: This safety device can detect the presence of any road vehicles
stuck on the level crossing.
The Accident Database gives the characteristics of the accidents that have occurred
at the crossings, with 57 attributes for each accident. Accident cause, type of road
traffic involved in the accident and consequences (fatalities, injuries, train delays and
delay hours, number of trains cancelled) are some of the impdrtant attributes of the
accidents. JR East identifies seven causes of accidents at level crossings: intrusion
against the level crossing gate, ignorance of warning, illegally going through a Grade
4 crossing (impossible traversing), clearance invasion, wheel wreck, engine stalling
and traffic congestion. The Accident Database is given in Appendix B of the thesis.
An exploratory analysis of the two databases is carried out in Section 3.3 and Sec-
tion 3.4 and tries to identify the crossing attributes and their combinations that are
significant to the study of the accidents. To this end, a statistical analysis which tries
to ascertain the behavior of the attributes is carried out.
The risk assessment methodology is developed for the crossing accidents by defining
159
Left side barrier down;
right side barrier
starts comina Right side barrier
fore the
;~es the crossingWai
bell
ring
31 27 21 15 Osec
Figure 6-2: Functioning of a Grade 1 level crossing
lent rate and the weighted average consequences per accident. The accident
s defined as the number of accidents per million trains going across, and is
Acci
= LCi x (RTV) x (365) x (P.e) (6.1)
imber of accidents occurring due to cause i
mber of level crossings in the concerned group
ail traffic volume per day
days per year
iod of exposure, in years (the period of exposure is defined as the period in
e accidents have occurred at the crossings)
comes are considered for the consequences of an accident: third party fatal-
rd party injuries, train delays and train cancellations. The collective risk R
I as the product of the accident rate and the consequences per accident and
over all accident causes. To capture the perceptions associated with catas-
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trophic consequences, this definition of risk is extended to include the risk perception
weights for different outcomes (Table 3.16 [16]) and the new defiinition of risk, namely,
the perceived risk Rp is presented. Finally, the monetary collec ive risk Rm is defined
by assigning willingness-to-pay values (on the part of JR East) for the consequences
and is given by
8
Rm = Pi x [100 x (fai) + 1 x (ini) + 1 x (tdi) + 10 x (tci)] (6.2)
i=1
where
fai: third party fatality
ini: third party injury
tdi: train delay
tci: train cancellation
The methodology is applied to determine the accident rate p and the monetary col-
lective risk Rm for crossings grouped on the basis of specific attributes. A discussion
of the analysis is presented below:
Visibility of the crossing: Table 6.1 shows the accident rate by visibility of the
crossing from the road. The accident rate (per million trains) is higher when the
visibility of the crossing is lower, but it is significant only for crossings with very low
visibilities (of 20m or less). The mean accident rate for crossings with visibility less
than 20m is 50% higher than for crossings with greater than 20m visibility and is
statistically significant.
Road gradient: The accident rate (per million trains) is higher as the gradient
is upward or downward (Table 6.2). The mean accident rate for crossings with level
road gradient is 0.43 (per million trains) and is 0.55 (per million trains) for crossings
with upward or downward gradient, and the difference in the rates is statistically
significant.
Crossings by grade, but without obstacle detector: Grade 1 crossings are
safer than Grade 4 crossings, which in turn are safer than (rade 3 crossings (Fig-
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Accident rate (per million trains)
RTV 0-20m >20m
0-40 1.096 0.828
40-80 0.725 0.537
80-120 0.559 0.309
120-160 0.441 0.361
Table 6.1: Accident rate by visibility of the crossing
Accident rate (per million train$)
RTV Level Not level
0-40 0.716 0.833
40-80 0.280 0.626
80-120 0.258 0.357
120-160 0.455 0.382
Table 6.2: Accident rate by road gradient
ure 6-3). The mean accident rate at Grade 1 crossings is 0.(9 (per million trains),
for Grade 4 crossings is 0.76 (per million trains) and is 1.25 (per million trains) for
Grade 3 crossings. The mean monetary collective risk Rm at Grade 1 crossings is 45
million yen (per million trains), for Grade 4 crossings is 61 n illion yen (per million
trains) and is 103 million yen (per million trains) for Grade 3 crossings.
Crossings by type of barrier, but without obstacle detector: Crossings with
semiautomatic-automatic barrier are slightly safer than those with automatic barrier
(Figure 6-4). The mean accident rate for crossings with automatic barrier is 0.62
(per million trains) and is 0.60 (per million trains) for crossings with semiautomatic-
automatic barrier, but the difference in the rates is not statis4 ically significant. The
mean risk is 50 million yen (per million trains) for crossings with automatic barrier
and is 36 million yen (per million trains) for crossings with semiautomatic automatic
barrier.
Crossings with obstacle detector: Crossings equipped
have a lower accident rate and risk than crossings without
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with obstacle detector
detector (Figure 6-5).
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Crossings with detectors have a mean accident rate of 0.12 (per million trains) and
risk of 7 million yen (per million trains) whereas crossings without detectors have
an accident rate of 0.43 (per million trains) and risk of 54 mi4lion yen (per million
trains).
Catastrophic level crossing accidents are rare, yet their risk is not "zero" since they
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board the train, but a catastrophic accident is possible. Level crossing accidents with
large consequences around the world have involved a train hittkng a large truck or a
bus and resulting in numerous casualties. This gives us an idea to estimate the risk
of a catastrophic level crossing accident on the JR East network.
To determine the accident rate, we look at accidents on JR East involving a truck and
a bus and calculate the rate to be 0.026 (per million trains) and 0.012 (per million
trains) respectively (for a mean rail traffic of 90 trains per day).
The weighted consequences from the Global Accident Database for level crossings [2]
for trucks and buses is 93 billion yen and 21 billion yen. This gives the monetary
collective risk Rm of a catastrophic accident involving trucks. to be 2.4 billion yen
and buses to be 0.24 billion yen. These values provide upper bounds to the risk of a
catastrophic level crossing accident.
A perusal of the accident causes in Table 6.3 shows that more than half the accidents
have occurred due to illegal crossings (ignorance of warning,. intrusion against the
crossing gate and illegally going through a Grade 4 crossing). 'This suggests that hu-
man factors are a very important component of crossing accidents. To that end, we
decided to observe the perceived actions of the road users at crossings on the JR East
network. This was done during my internship at JR East in the summer of 1995. I
observed the behavior of the vehicles at two crossings and recorded the flow of traffic
on tapes. The tapes were later analyzed at MIT. The analysis tried to answer the
following questions:
1. What is the likelihood that the first vehicle arriving at the crossing goes through
as the warning bell is ringing?
2. Given that the first vehicle has gone through, what is the likelihood that the
second vehicle goes through the crossing as the warning bell is ringing?
3. What is the likelihood that a vehicle goes through the ciossing as the barrier is
coming down?
Each of the above questions was answered by constructing pr)bability trees for both
crossings to determine the likelihood of a vehicle going through A detailed description
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Accident cause No. of accidents % oflaccidents
Intrusion against LC gate 145 5.64
Ignorance of warning 196 21.14
Impossible traversing 151 16.29
Side hit 36 3.88
Clearance invasion 77 8.31
Wheel wreck 93 10.03
Engine stalling 93 !10.03
Traffic congestion 67 7.23
Device trouble - -
Others 69 7.44
Table 6.3: Level crossing accidents by cause
is presented in Section 4.1. The following general conclusions can be
analysis:
drawn from the
1. Most vehicles go through the crossing if they are the first vehicle at the crossing
when the warning bell just starts ringing.
2. Fewer vehicles go through the crossing if they are the second vehicle at the
crossing when the warning bell is ringing.
3. Most automobiles stop at the crossing when the level crossing barrier starts
coming down. But, bicycles and pedestrians do go through the crossing, even
when the barrier is coming down.
4. A few bicycles go through the crossing after the barrier on the left side of the
road is down (Figure 4-1).
Most vehicles stopped at the crossing go through when the warning bell stops
ringing after the train has passed, and almost immedidtely starts ringing (2-3
seconds) because another train is approaching the cross
6. The interaction between the level crossing attributes ar
the road driver is a crucial component of level crossing
ing.
d the human factors of
accidents.
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Thus, the above discussion suggests that the interaction between the human factors
and various crossing attributes is a crucial component in the study of crossing acci-
dents. A model that captures this interaction is developed to predict level crossing
accidents on the JR East network. It considers four factors:
1. Accident causality parameter: This parameter captures the human factors in-
volved in the three categories of accidents: intrusion, ignorance and caught in
the crossing. A "risk parameter" defined for each type of accident captures the
underlying human factors involved in the accident.
2. Rail awareness factor: This factor accounts for the awareness of the crossing in
terms of the rail traffic volume at the crossing. Low rail traffic volume crossings
have a higher rail awareness factor compared to high rail traffic volume crossings.
3. Road awareness factor: This factor accounts for the aw reness of the crossing
from the point of view of the road traffic, with low road traffic volume crossings
having a higher awareness factor than high rail traffic vl1ume ones.
4. Calibration factor: This factor is used to calibrate the model.
The predicted accident rate pi is given by
Pi= Causei x (Awaii) x (Awrod) x (Cal) (6.3)
where
pi: Accident rate for a group of crossings
Causei: Risk parameter pertaining to the different categorieq of accidents
Aw'ail: Rail awareness factor
Awroad: Road awareness factor
Cali: Calibration factor
The details of the model are presented in Section 4.3 wher the significance of the
various parameters are discussed and two runs of the model are shown. A goodness
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of fit test shows that the model predicts the observed accidents: well.
As discussed in Section 5.1, there are always limited resources available for spending
on safety. Thus, the resources should be allocated among computing safety measures
in such a way that maximum benefit is achieved in terms of risk reduction. The
competing measures are as follows:
1. Low cost measures
* Signage at low visibility crossings
* Painting the surface of roads at low visibility crossings
* Roughening the surface of roads at crossings with significant downward
road gradient
2. Medium cost measures
* Installing alarm buttons
* Installing overhanging warning devices
3. High cost measures
* Installing level crossing barriers
* Installing obstacle detectors
* Grade separation
4. Enforcement
5. Education and media campaigns
We employ a benefit-cost approach to evaluate the efficacy ofi various risk reduction
measures. This approach evaluates the benefits associated With each of the safety
measures (in terms of reducing the risk) and the cost of install'ng the safety measure.
If the benefits outweight the costs, then the installation of the safety measure is
justified. This approach is applied to the following crossing a tributes:
1. Type of safety device
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* Grade 4 crossing, which has neither a warning system nor a barrier
* Grade 3 crossing, with a warning system but no barrier
* Grade 1 crossing, with a warning system and barrier
* Grade 1 crossing with obstacle detector
* Grade separated crossing
2. Crossings by visibility of the crossing
3. Crossings by road gradient of the crossing
Table 6.4 shows the cost of the various level crossing attributes. The initial costs
were provided by the Safety Research Laboratory of JR East. The annual costs
are calculated assuming that the equivalent uniform annual cost (EUAC) of a safety
device is 10% of its total cost and the maintenance cost is 5% of the total cost and
the life of the device is 20 years. The table uses the following legends:
* G4: Grade 4 crossing
* G3: Grade 3 crossing
* GI: Grade 1 crossing
* Gl+O.d: Grade 1 crossing equipped with an obstacle detector
* G.s: Grade separated crossing
The benefit-cost analysis uses the accident rates shown in Table 6.5 [15]. The expected
consequences per accident are shown in Table 6.6. The efficacy of the safety devices
are discussed for two categories of rail traffic volume:
1. Low rail traffic volume crossings (30 trains per day)
2. High rail traffic volume crossings (150 trains per day)
The following analyses assume the value of life to be 100 millior yen.
Low rail traffic volume crossings
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Upgrade Initial cost (million yen) Annual cost (million yen)
G4 - G3 11 1.65
G3 -+ G1 8 1.2
G4 -+ G1 <19 <2.85
Obstacle detector 17 2.55
Alarm button 0.4 for 2 devices 0.06
Overhang warning device 3.4 for 2 devices 0.51
Big barrier 0.2 for 2 barriers 0.03
Grade separation (G.s) 100 10
Table 6.4: Costs of the various safety upgrades
RTV G.s G1+O.d GI G3 G4
10 0 1.240 1.810 3.620 7.240
30 0 0.790 1.780 3.560 7.120
50 0 0.670 1.960 3.920 7.840
70 0 0.610 2.140 4.280 8.560
90 0 0.580 2.310 4.620 9.240
110 0 0.570 2.480 4.960 9.920
130 0 0.540 2.500 5.000 10.000
150 0 0.470 2.600 5.200 10.400
170 0 0.460 2.500 5.000 10.000
190 0 0.450 2.400 4.800 9.600
210 0 0.440 2.300 4.600 9.200
230 0 0.430 2.200 4.400 8.800
250 0 0.420 2.100 4.200 8.400
Table 6.5: Accident rate (per million trains) by rail t4ffic volume
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RTV Automobile Freight truck Motorcycle BicyCle Pedestrian
10 5 3 10 10 10
30 10 5 15 15, 15
50 15 10 18 18 18
70 20 16 20 20 20
90 25 23 23 23 23
110 30 30 26 26 26
130 35 36 29 29 29
150 40 42 32 32 32
170 45 48 35 35 35
190 50 56 38 38 38
210 65 64 51 51 51
230 70 80 54 54 54
250 80 100 62 62 62
Table 6.6: Expected consequences per accident (million yen) by rail traffic volume
The benefit-cost analysis for crossings with a rail traffic of 30 trains per day is shown
in Table 6.7. The analysis justifies the upgrades of a Grade 4 crossing to a Grade 3
crossing and a Grade 3 crossing to a Grade 1 crossing. The installation of an obstacle
detector is not justified since these crossings have a low volume of rail traffic and have
few accidents due to vehicles caught in the crossing.
High rail traffic volume crossings
Upgrade pl p2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w ARm/Ac
G4 -+ G3 0.078 0.039 0.039 1.65 0.024 60 1.44
G3 -÷ G1 0.039 0.020 0.019 1.20 0.016 60 0.96
G1 - G1+O.d 0.020 0.009 0.011 2.55 0.004 ;60 0.26
Gl+O.d -+ G.s 0.009 0.000 0.009 10 9.0e-4 60 0.054
Table 6.7: Cost benefit analysis for low rail traffic volume crossings
Table 6.8 shows the benefit-cost analysis for crossings having a rail traffic volume of
150 trains per day. The upgrades of a Grade 4 to a Grade 3 cro sing, a Grade 3 to a
Grade 1 crossing and a Grade 1 crossing to that with a detector are clearly justified.
A sensitivity analysis is done by varying the estimates of th value of life. Two
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Upgrade pi p2 Ap Ac Ap/Ac w ARm/Ac
G4 -- G3 0.570 0.285 0.285 1.65 0.173 1178 30.75
G3 -+ G1 0.285 0.143 0.142 1.20 0.118 178 21.06
G1 -~ G1+O.d 0.143 0.026 0.117 2.55 0.046 178 8.17
G1+O.d -+ G.s 0.026 0.000 0.026 10 2.6e-3 178 0.46
Table 6.8: Cost benefit analysis for high rail traffic volume crossings
estimates are considered:
1. Value of life of 260 million yen (value used in the US)
2. Value of life of 25.6 million yen (value suggested by JR East)
The benefit-cost analyses show that the ratio ARm/Ac is sensitive to the value of life
estimates.
The three components of the risk assessment methodology discussed so far, namely,
risk analysis, risk appraisal and cost-benefit analysis need to be tied together into
an action plan for level crossing safety. This plan is referred to as the Risk Manage-
ment Plan. The Plan allocates resources among competing safety measures, keeping
in mind the accident scenario(s) addressed by each safety measure and the orga-
nization(s) responsible for the implementation of that safety measure. A detailed
description of the Risk Management Plan is presented in Section 5.4. In addition
to installing safety devices at crossings, the Risk Management Plan emphasizes the
importance of enforcement and education campaigns in reducing crossing accidents.
Thus, the Risk Management Plan acts as a guideline to JR East to determine an
efficient allocation of resources for level crossing safety.
6.2 Conclusions
The previous section summarizes the research on level crossing safety carried out in
this thesis. The main conclusions of the work are presented below:
Factors affecting the risk of a level crossing accident
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The exploratory analysis of the crossing accidents shows that the level crossing at-
tributes: rail traffic volume, type of road traffic at the crossirg, road traffic volume,
location of the crossing, visibility of the crossing from the rohd, road gradient, dis-
tance of the crossing to the nearest road intersection, width of the crossing (number
of tracks) and the level of safety at the crossing influence the accident rate and the
monetary collective risk Rm of a level crossing accident.
Crossings with visibility less than 20 m have a 50% higher mean accident rate than
crossings with visibility greater than 20 m, and the difference is statistically signifi-
cant.
The mean accident rate for crossings with level road gradient is 0.43 (per million
trains) and is 0.55 (per million trains) for crossings with upward or downward gradi-
ent.
The accident rate monotonically increases as the width of the crossing increases. As
the number of tracks increase, the accident exposure increases leading to a higher
accident rate.
Crossings with low rail and road traffic volume are riskier than high rail and road
traffic volume crossings. The mean accident rate at crossings with a rail traffic vol-
ume of 20-40 trains per day is 0.91 (per million trains) and is 0.49 (per million trains)
for crossings with a rail traffic of 140-160 trains per day. At low road traffic volume
crossings, the likelihood that a vehicle will go through the crossing as the warning
bell is ringing is high since there are possibly no vehicles in front of it and the risk
increases if the rail traffic is low since the vehicle may not be aware of the approach
of a train. The risk is lower at high road traffic volume crossings since a vehicle will
have to stop just because there are vehicles in front of it at the crossing.
Consequences of the accidents
None of the level crossing accidents have resulted in passenger fatalities, though 10
accidents have resulted in minor passenger injuries. 197 accid nts have resulted in
1 third party fatality and 8 accidents in 2 third party fatalities. 163 accidents have
resulted in 1 third party injury, 16 in two injuries and 1 in more than 9 injuries.
An interesting finding is that some accidents have resulted in si nificant train delays
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with a number of trains being delayed and some trains cancelled. The mean train
delay is 30 minutes, though an accident on the highest train drnsity lines can lead to
hundreds of trains being delayed and cancelled. Thus, in som accidents, the conse-
quences of train delays and cancellations are an order of magnitude higher than the
consequences of fatalities and injuries. So, the definition of the monetary collective
risk Rm includes train delays and cancellations in addition to fatalities and injuries
as the consequences of a level crossing accident.
Though the crossing accidents on the JR East network have resulted in minor con-
sequences for the passengers on board the train, the possibility of a catastrophic
accident cannot be ruled out even though it is very unlikely. A level crossing accident
can become catastrophic if a train collides with a heavy vehicle like a truck and the
crossing is located in an urban area. In fact, catastrophic accidents around the world
have resulted from a train colliding with a truck or a bus and the worst accident in
the last 15 years involved a train colliding with a heavy truck and resulted in 100
passenger fatalities and 125 total fatalities. We estimate the monetary collective risk
Rm of a catastrophic accident on the JR East network to be 2.4 billion yen (accident
involving a train colliding with a truck). This is an upper bound on the risk of a
catastrophic level crossing accident.
Effectiveness of safety devices
Grade 1 crossings have a lower accident rate and monetary collective risk than Grade
4 crossings, which are in turn safer than Grade 3 crossings. The mean accident rate
at Grade 1 crossings is 0.59 per million trains, for Grade 3 crossings is 1.25 per million
trains and is 0.76 per million trains for Grade 4 crossings.
Crossings with semiautomatic-automatic barrier are slightly safer than those equipped
with automatic barrier. The mean accident rate for crossings with automatic barrier is
0.62 per million trains and is 0.60 per million trains for crossings with semiautomatic-
automatic barrier.
Crossings equipped with obstacle detectors have a lower accider t rate and monetary
collective risk than crossings without detectors. The mean accident rate reduces from
0.43 per million trains to 0.12 per million trains after the inst llation of detectors.
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The monetary collective risk reduces by almost a factor of 7 at crossings with detec-
tors.
Importance of human factors
Human factors are a very important component of crossing accidents, as half the
accidents have resulted due to intrusion and ignorance of warning. An analysis of the
perceived actions of the road users at crossings show the following:
1. Most vehicles go through the crossing if they are the first vehicle at the crossing
when the warning bell just starts ringing.
2. Most automobiles stop at the crossing when the level crossing barrier starts
coming down. But bicycles and pedestrians go through the crossing even when
the barrier is coming down.
3. Most vehicles stopped at the crossing go through when the warning bell stops
ringing after the train has passed, and almost immediately starts ringing (within
2-3 seconds) as another train is approaching the crossing.
4. The interaction between the level crossing attributes and the human factors of
the road driver is a crucial component of level crossing accidents.
Risk management applications
Risk management techniques can be effectively applied to allocate resources for level
crossing safety. The strategies range from relatively inexpensive measures like signage
and roughening the surface of roads to medium cost measures like installing alarm
buttons and overhang warning devices to expensive options like upgrading crossings
with barriers and obstacle detectors (the costs of the measures are shown in Table 6.4).
In addition, educating the public about the dangers of illegal crossings through media
announcements and publicity campaigns is an important low cost strategy. The
resources for these competing strategies can be allocated using a benefit-cost criterion.
The important results are shown below:
1. At low rail traffic volume crossings (30 trains per day), the!upgrades of a Grade
4 crossing to a Grade 3 crossing and a Grade 3 crossing tp a Grade 1 crossing
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are clearly justified, whereas the installation of obstacle detectors is not justified
(Table 6.7).
2. At high rail traffic volume crossings (150 trains per day), the installation of
obstacle detectors is clearly justified in addition to the two upgrades mentioned
above (Table 6.8).
3. The efficacy of the various safety devices is a function of the parameters used
to define the monetary collective risk Rm. For example, the justification of the
safety devices is sensitive to the estimates of the value of life used to define .Rm.
4. Signage and painting the surface of roads to ensure increased visibility of cross-
ings and roughening the surface of roads with significant road gradient are
justified from a risk-cost criterion.
5. Finally, education and media campaigns have potential benefits in warning the
public about the dangers of illegal crossings, and are feasible from a benefit-cost
criterion.
6.3 Recommendations to JR East
The following are the general recommendations to the Safety Research Laboratory of
JR East regarding level crossing safety:
1. The JR East Accident Database is comprehensive in its description of the ac-
cidents and has detailed records of all the accidents that have occurred on the
network. The company should continually upgrade the Database and rectify
any possible fallacies in recording entries. For example, one of the accident
causes - impossible traversing was misinterpreted when information was being
gathered about the accidents. Care should be taken to ccllect such data care-
fully in the future. Also, information about the accidents zould be shared with
the other railroads in Japan and other railroads around tie world so that any
unaccounted for attributes could be incorporated in the Database.
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2. The risk assessment methodology described in this thesis has been applied to
analyze the level crossing accidents between April, 1987 to March, 1993. JR
East could easily update the analyses periodically and also account for time
varying patterns in the traffic volumes at crossings. The methodology could
also be applied to analyze the rich data of "near-misses". For instance, there are
a number of instances of broken barriers when vehicles deliberately ignore the
warning and hit the barriers. In 1993 alone, there were about 5,000 instances
when barriers were broken. These events can be used to construct possible
accident scenarios and extended to construct fault trees for the level crossing
accidents.
3. The risk model described in Section 4.3 considers both the human factors in-
volved in crossing accidents and the crossing attributes and predicts the acci-
dents. The model could be run on different combinations of crossing attributes,
keeping in mind the limits of statistical sufficiency.
4. Resources can be allocated for level crossing safety using the Risk Manage-
ment Plan described in Section 5.4. JR East should continually examine its
investment criteria among competing options and allocate resources based on
the optimal risk cost criterion. Specifically, JR East should allocate resources
among competing options to satisfy the following upgrades:
* Install warning signs by the side of the road or paint the road surface at
crossings with very low visibility (less than 20m).
* Roughen the surface of roads having significant downward road gradient
leading to the crossing.
* Upgrade Grade 4 and Grade 3 crossings to Grade 1 crossings at crossings
having a low volume of at least 30 trains per day, justifying the upgrades
with other competing measures for safety improvement.
* Install obstacle detectors at crossings with high rail traffic volume (150
trains per day) in urban areas, justifying the installation with other com-
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peting measures.
* Install alarm buttons at crossings to act as an aid to detectors so that
the consequences of certain possible accidents can be reduced, even if they
cannot be prevented.
* Install overhanging warning devices at very low visibility crossings, in ad-
dition to putting up signs or painting the road surface.
* Provide big barriers (or double bar barriers) at crossings having a sig-
nificant truck or bus traffic (50 vehicles per day) so that the crossing is
visible. This also has implications for reducing the risk of catastrophic
level crossing accidents.
* Grade separate crossings in urban areas having a high rail traffic volume,
justifying its upgrade with other investments. Work with local govern-
ments and highway authorities to ease the implementation of grade sepa-
ration at necessary crossings to relieve congestion and improve the safety
of the network.
* Advocate education and media campaigns against illegal crossings, stress-
ing the different types and consequences of crossing accidents and the per-
ceived actions of the road users at crossings.
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Appendix A
The Level Crossing Database
Column number Attribute Data Definition
1 branch office 21 Morioka
22 Akita
23 Tohoku (Sendai)
30 Niigata
41 Takasaki
42 Mito
43 Chiba
46 Tokyo
51 Nagano
2 line number line name code
3 line alias number line alias code
4 track grade 1 grade 1
2 grade 2
3 grade 3
co tinued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
4 grade 4
5 location number starting point station
6 ditto number terminal point station
7 ditto number distance from starting station
8 level crossing number branch office code + level crossing
code code identifies each level crossing
9 level crossing 1 grade 1
grade 3 grade 3
4 grade 4
10 gate mechanism 0 none
1 automatic
2 semiautomatic-automatic
3 non-automatic
11 watchman 0 none
1 with watchman
12 traffic congestion 0 none
1 no passage of automobiles
2 no passage ýxcept for motorcycles,
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
farming automobiles and light
weight cars
3 no passage of large-sized
automobiles
4 other regulations like one way etc.
13 level crossing 1 ordinary
type 2 shared with other railroads
3 access only for employees
4 temporary
14 winter regulation 0 none
1 no passage
2 pedestrians only
3 other regulations
15 length number length of the crossing way
16 crossing tracks number number of crossing tracks
17 crossing direction 0 rectangular
1 left side
2 right side
18 crossing angle number degree of crossing angle
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
19 track gradient 0 level
1 upward
2 downward
20 degree of gradient number unit: percent
21 track composition 1 one track
2 two tracks
3 three tracks
4 four tracks
5 five or more tracks
6 two single tracks in parallel
7 service track
8 industry track
22 width number crossing way width (in m)
23 ditto number width of the pavement
24 width disparity, left side width disparity between
left- the crossing way and the
approaching road
0 none
1 crossing is wider
2 approaching road is wider
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
25 disparity value, number left side width disparity value
left (in m)
26 width disparity, right side width disparity
right between the crossing way
and the approaching road
0 none
1 crossing is wider
2 approaching road is wider
27 disparity value, number right side width disparity value
right (in m)
28 pavement 1 concrete rigid frame
29 ditto 2 concrete
3 asphalt
4 wood with iron plate
5 wood
6 stone
9 others
30 visibility, number visibility on the left side of the
left road (in m)
31 visibility, number visibility on the right side of
right the road (in m)
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
32 wheel protection 0 none
1 guide wall
2 approach slope
3 guide wall and approach slope
33 track alignment 1 straight
2 curved
34 radius number curve radius (in m)
35 rubber 0 without wheel protection rubber
1 with wheel protection rubber
36 width, left number gross width of left side road
observed from track starting
side (in m)
37 ditto number effective width for wheeled vehicle
of the left side road observed from
track starting side (in m)
38 width, right number gross width of the right side
road observed from track
starting side (in m)
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
39 ditto number effective width for wheeled vehicle
of the right side road observed
from track starting side (in m)
40 road gradient, 0 level
left 1 upward
2 downward
9 steps - for pedestrians only
41 ditto number left side degree of road gradient
(in m)
42 road gradient, 0 level
right 1 upward
2 downward
9 steps
43 ditto number right side degree of
road gradient (in m)
44 road alignment, 1 straight
left 2 curved
45 road alignment, 1 straight
right 2 curved
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
46 intersection number left side distance to
nearby intersection
(in m)
47 intersection number right side distance to
nearby intersection
(in m)
48 track perspective, number track perspective
left starting distance (in m)
49 ditto, left terminal number from left side to track
terminal side (in in)
50 ditto, right starting number from right side to track
starting side (in m)
51 ditto, right terminal number from right side to track
terminal side (in m)
52 maximum speed number maximum train speed
(in km/h)
53 minimum speed number minimum train speed
(in km/h)
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
54 train perspective, number maximumi distance from
starting which driver can observe
level crossing from track
starting side (in m)
55 ditto, terminal number from track terminal side
(in m)
56 school 0 without road regulation for
school attendance
1 with road regulation for
school attendance
57 circumstance 1 industrial
2 commercial
3 residential
4 rural
5 port
58 kindergarten, number distance to nearby kindergarten or
left elementary school, left side (in m)
59 ditto, right number right side (in m)
60 magnification number time of road magnification
(year, month)
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
61 rigid frame number time of installation of concrete rigid
frame pavement (year, month)
62 alarm button 0 none
1 type A
2 type B
3 type C
4 type D
9 others
63 ditto number number of alarm buttons, left side
64 ditto number ditto, right side
65 obstruction 0 none
detector 1 LED
2 loop coil
3 laser rays
4 photo tubes
5 supersonic waves
9 others
66 ditto (year) number year when the detector was
installed
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
67 ditto (month) number month of installation
68 direction indicator 0 none
1 with direction indicator
69 warning device, number number of overhanging warning
left devices, left side
70 ditto, right number ditto, right side
71 gate composition 0 none
1 1 pair of full interception
2 2 pairs of full interception
3 3 or more pairs of full
interception
4 1 pair of semi interception
5 2 pairs of semi interception
6 3 or more pairs of semi
interception
9 others
72 interception gap number in m
73 road traffic sign 0 no interlocking
1 green in normalcy
2 yellow intermittent in normalcy
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
3 yellow in normalcy
4 red in normalcy
9 other type of interlocking
74 warning number maximum warning duration for up
train (in sec)
75 ditto number maximum warning duration for down
train (in sec)
76 ditto number minimum warning duration for up
train (in sec)
77 ditto number minimum warning duration for down
train (in sec)
78 rail traffic number rail traffic volume per day
volume
79 ditto number maximum rail traffic volume
per hour
80 road traffic number converted road traffic volume
volume per day
81 ditto number maximum converted road traffic
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
volume per hour
82 pedestrian number number of passing pedestrians
per day
83 light vehicle number number of light vehicles per day
84 motorcycle number number of passing motorcycles
per day
85 automobile number number of passing tricycles and
automobiles per day
86 bus number number of buses among the above
counted automobiles
87 truck number number of trucks among the above
counted automobiles
88 road traffic number road traffic volume at the time of
maximum rail traffic volume
89 rail traffic number rail traffic volume at the time of
maximum road traffic volume
90 interception number intercepted road traffic volume
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
91 ditto number total interception duration per day
(in hour)
92 ditto number maximum interception duration per hour
(in minutes)
Appendix B
The Accident Database
Column number Attribute Data Definition
1 accident features 1 1 responsible and serious accident
2 responsible and quasi-serious
accident
A responsible accident
3 responsible incident, rank A
4 serious
5 quasi-serious
6 contractor responsibility
8 responsible incident, rank B
9 others
2 accident feature 2 1 accident on track blockade
2 accident on use of maintenance
vehicle
3 ditto 3 accident on use of trolley
4 accident due to home signal
overrun
cobtinued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
5 accident due to shunting
signal overrun
6 accident in disordered train
schedule
7 miscellaneous warning giving
accident
10 accident on signal transfer work
11 accident on maintenence work
12 accident on shunting
13 on way door release accident
14 train separation
15 brake inaction
16 brake inability
17 track circuit failure
18 signal indication error accident
19 accident on substitutive blockade
90 others
4 branch office 1 Morioka
2 Akita
3 Sendai
4 Niigata
5 Takasaki
6 Mito
7 Chiba
9 Tokyo
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
11 Nagano
5 accident number number Branch office code + year
+ month + accident number
identifies each accident case
6 year number Japanese era named year
7 ditto number
8 month number
9 day number
10 hour number
11 minute number
12 weather 1 sunny
2 cloudy
3 rainy
4 snowy
5 foggy
6 stormy
7 snow stormy
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
8 typhoon
9 others
13 branch office 1-11 as defined in column 4
14 line number line name code
15 station number station number
16 ditto ditto
17 location 1 station area
A ditto (main down-line)
B ditto (main up-line)
2 inter station area
C ditto (down-line)
D ditto (up-line)
3 station area and
inter-station area
E ditto (down-line)
F ditto (up-line)
4 depot area
5 workshop area
18 train type 1 passenger car train
2 electricity car train
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
3 diesel car train
4 cargo train
5 mixed train
6 freight train
7 special train
8 single car train
9 shunting car
11 detained car
12 remaining car
13 trolley
14 maintenance car
10 sundry cars
90 others
19 train number number
20 accident class 1 train accident
21 accident group 135 level crossing accident
22 level crossing type 11 grade 1
12 grade 2
13 grade 3
14 grade 4
23 accident cause 31 intrusion against level
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
crossing gate
32 ignorance of warning
33 impossible traversing
34 side hit
35 clearance invasion
36 wheel wreck
37 engine stalling
38 traffic congestion
39 device trouble
40 level crossing gate inaction
90 others
24 road traffic 51 bus
52 passenger automobile
53 large sized freight truck
54 dump truck, concrete mixer
truck
55 ordinary freight truck
56 tricycle automobile
57 special automobile
58 farming automobile
59 motorcycle
60 light vehicle
61 pedestrian
62 others
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
25 railroad facility factor 1 transaction
2 rolling stock
3 infrastructure
4 construction work
5 conflicted factors
6 level crossing
7 sabotage
8 accidental fire
9 natural hazard
10 under investigation
11 transaction (level crossing)
90 others
26 blank
27 railroad operation factor 1 departure
2 arrival
3 turn
4 passage of stops
5 on way into
maintenance depot
6 on way out of
maintenance depot
7 driving
8 coasting
9 shu ting
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
10 condition watched with
attention
11 door in motion
12 on route clearing
13 on control panel watching
14 on monitor panel watching
15 on patrol
16 at work
17 under inspection
18 warning ringing
99 others
28 phenomenon 1 engine inaction
2 engine drive inaction
29 ditto 3 deficient acceleration
4 engine stalling
5 stiffened brake
6 deficient brake force
7 emergency braking
8 ABB, VCB inaction
9 ABB, VCB open
10 circuit braker open
11 reverser trouble
12 switch trouble
13 door trouble
14 flash over
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
15 MG inaction
16 air pressure deficiency
17 driver's lamp trouble
18 trouble lamp lighting
19 lamp break
20 arc
21 signal indication trouble
22 route release trouble
23 direction setting trouble
24 wrong route release
25 switch operation trouble
26 interlocking trouble
27 control trouble
28 track short circuit
29 track short circuit trouble
30 communication trouble
31 wrong indication
32 erroneous departure indication
33 stop indication
34 level crossing gate inaction, warning inaction
35 functioning of obstruction detector
36 functioning of obstruction warning device
37 special alarm system indication
38 fire tube ignition
39 track distortion
40 lateral distortion of track
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
41 slope failure
42 road bed cave-in
43 track flooding
44 excess of regulation valve
45 tree fall
46 snow avalanche
47 rock fall
48 power failure
49 contact wire break
50 contact wire slack
51 circuit breaker open
52 blown-in obstacle
53 switch running through
54 derailment due to climbing
over on switch
55 derailment due to
branching away on switch
56 continuation of operation
57 backward movement without
announcement
58 stop sign
59 obstacle detection
60 overturning
61 downfall
62 plunging trespasser
63 lying trespasser
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
64 walking trespasser
65 unusual noise
66 unusual odour
67 fire smoking
68 impact
69 clearance invasion
99 others
30 branch office 21 Morioka
22 Akita
23 Sendai
30 Niigata
41 Takasaki
42 Mito
43 Chiba
46 Tokyo
51 Nagano
31 level crossing code number
32 influence to train 1 delayed and/or cancelled
operation train
hline 2 without influence to train
operation
33 delay time number delay time of concerned
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
train (in min)
34 cancelled train 1 one or more
2 none
35 number of cancelled number
trains
36 number of delayed number
trains
37 maximum train number in min
delay time
38 total delay time number in min
39 weighting factor 1 potential to bear fatalities
2 potential to bear derailment,
collision or train fire accident
3 large influence to train schedule
4 with property damage
5 small influence to train schedule
40 time 1 daytime, weekday
2 nighttime, weekday
3 weekend
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
41 location 1 double track
2 single track (automatic block)
3 single track (non-automatic block)
,12 weather 1 sunny or cloudy
2 rainy
3 snowy
43 cause 1 human error
2 device trouble
3 man-induced hazard
4 natural hazard
44 Io number injury (passenger not on board)
45 Fo number fatality (passenger not on board)
46 Ip number injury (passenger on board)
47 Fp number fatality (passenger on board)
48 It number injury (third party person)
49 Ft number fatality (third party person)
continued on next page
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Column number Attribute Data Definition
50 Iw number injury (sub-worker)
51 Fw number fatality (sub-worker)
52 lel number injury (employee)
53 Fel number fatality (employee)
54 Ie2 number injury (employee, not on duty)
55 Fe2 number fatality (employee, not on duty)
56 I(sum) number injury (total)
57 F(sum) number fatality (total)
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Appendix C
Risk for crossings by type of
safety device and road traffic
This appendix shows the accident rate, the weighted consequences per accident and
the monetary collective risk Rm for crossings grouped on the basis of the type of
safety device and the road traffic involved in the accident. It details the schematic
diagram shown in Figure 3-27. The following tables use the legends shown below:
1. #LC: Number of level crossings
2. #ACC: Number of accidents
3. p: Accident rate (per million trains)
4. w: Weighted consequences per accident
5. Rm: Monetary collective risk (million yen)
C.1 Crossings with automatic barrier and with-
out obstacle detector
This section shows the accident rate and the monetary collective risk for crossings
equipped with automatic barrier but without obstcale detector.
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RTV Automobile traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 79 0 0 0 0
20-40 339 10 0.45 6.50 2.91
40-60 176 3 0.16 17.67 2.75
60-80 157 3 0.12 12.67 1.58
80-100 58 1 0.09 33 2.88
100-120 98 4 0.17 34 5.76
120-160 45 3 0.22 132.67 28.85
160-200 18 2 0.28 297.5 83.9
200-400 32 1 0.05 245 11.65
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 112 0 0 0 0
20-40 378 4 0.17 9.75 1.57
40-60 175 5 0.26 6.60 1.72
60-80 142 5 0.23 25.40 5.83
80-100 61 2 0.17 118 19.63
100-120 86 5 0.24 17.4 4.20
120-160 80 4 0.16 80.50 13.13
160-200 44 6 0.35 32.17 11.13
200-400 28 0 0 0 0
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C.1.1 Automobile traffic
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 1000-5000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 46 1 0.99 2 1.98
20-40 166 9 0.83 20 16.50
40-60 55 2 0.33 6.50 2.16
60-80 48 1 0.14 35 4.76
80-100 22 0 0 0 0
100-120 25 0 0 0 0
120-160 28 3 0.35 32 11.20
160-200 33 9 0.69 30.67 21.22
200-400 21 4 0.29 79.50 23.09
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 5000-10000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 5 1 9.1 5 45.5
20-40 27 4 2.3 2.5 5.75
40-60 16 0 0 0 0
60-80 6 0 0 0 0
80-100 3 2 3.38 14.5 49.01
100-120 3 0 0 0 0
120-160 2 0 0 0 0
160-200 2 0 0 0 0
200-400 6 3 0.76 82 62.32
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C.1.2 Freight truck traffic
RTV Freight truck traffic volume: 0-50
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 144 1 0.32 26 8.25
20-40 340 3 0.13 13 1.69
40-60 137 1 0.07 0 0
60-80 97 1 0.07 1 0.07
80-100 31 0 0 0 0
100-120 84 0 0 0 0
120-160 49 2 0.13 13 1.69
160-200 25 0 0 0 0
200-400 13 0 0 0 0
RTV Freight truck traffic volume: 50-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 10 0 0 0 0
20-40 47 1 0.32 2 0.64
40-60 17 0 0 0 0
60-80 8 0 0 0 0
80-100 5 0 0 0 0
100-120 4 0 0 0 0
120-160 5 1 0.65 6 3.90
160-200 5 0 0 0 0
200-400 6 0 0 0 0
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RTV Freight truck traffic volume: 100-200
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 7 0 0 0 0
20-40 43 0 0 0 0
40-60 9 0 0 0 0
60-80 10 0 0 0 0
80-100 2 0 0 0 0
100-120 4 0 0 0 0
120-160 4 0 0 0 0
160-200 4 1 0.63 2 1.26
200-400 2 0 0 0 0
RTV Freight truck traffic volume: >200
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 13 0 0 0 0
20-40 39 0 0 0 0
40-60 12 2 1.52 19.5 29.64
60-80 9 1 0.73 2 1.46
80-100 5 0 0 0 0
100-120 5 0 0 0 0
120-160 2 0 0 0 0
160-200 7 0 0 0 0
200-400 1 0 0 0 0
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RTV Motorcycle traffic volume: 0-50
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 190 0 0 0 0
20-40 528 3 0.09 34.67 3.12
40-60 283 1 0.03 101 3.26
60-80 261 1 0.03 101 2.52
80-100 76 0 0 0 0
100-120 147 1 0.03 6 0.18
120-160 92 0 0 0 0
160-200 42 1 0.06 105 6.34
200-400 40 0 0 0 0
RTV Motorcycle traffic volume: 50-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 37 0 0 0 0
20-40 136 0 0 0 0
40-60 53 0 0 0 0
60-80 62 1 0.11 2 0.22
80-100 22 0 0 0 0
100-120 29 0 0 0 0
120-160 37 0 0 0 0
160-200 19 0 0 0 0
200-400 16 0 0 0 0
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C.1.3 Motorcycle traffic
C.1.4 Light
RTV Motorcycle traffic volume: >100
#LC #ACC p w R,
0-20 31 0 0 0 0
20-40 135 0 0 0 0
40-60 44 0 0 0 0
60-80 37 0 0 0 0
80-100 15 0 0 0 0
100-120 26 0 0 0 0
120-160 23 1 0.14 0 0
160-200 30 0 0 0 0
200-400 33 1 0.05 61 2.82
vehicle traffic
RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 166 1 0.28 103 28.33
20-40 479 2 0.06 2.5 0.15
40-60 249 4 0.15 11 1.61
60-80 274 0 0 0 0
80-100 76 1 0.07 2 0.14
100-120 138 0 0 0 0
120-160 87 0 0 0 0
160-200 51 1 0.05 32 1.59
200-400 33 0 0 0 0
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RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rr
0-20 77 0 0 0 0
20-40 348 0 0 0 0
40-60 132 1 0.07 3 0.21
60-80 112 0 0 0 0
80-100 34 0 0 0 0
100-120 74 0 0 0 0
120-160 63 0 0 0 0
160-200 41 2 0.12 102 12.56
200-400 35 0 0 0 0
RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 1000-5000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 8 0 0 0 0
20-40 16 0 0 0 0
40-60 6 0 0 0 0
60-80 1 0 0 0 0
80-100 6 0 0 0 0
100-120 3 0 0 0 0
120-160 4 0 0 0 0
160-200 5 0 0 0 0
200-400 6 2 0.51 63.5 32.22
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RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 149 0 0 0 0
20-40 540 1 0.03 108 3.04
40-60 315 1 0.03 0 0
60-80 306 1 0.02 103 2.20
80-100 114 2 0.09 107.5 9.57
100-120 147 0 0 0 0
120-160 119 0 0 0 0
160-200 77 2 0.07 100 7.00
200-400 86 0 0 0 0
RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 102 0 0 0 0
20-40 407 2 0.08 52.5 3.93
40-60 136 0 0 0 0
60-80 89 1 0.07 11 0.77
80-100 59 0 0 0 0
100-120 97 2 0.09 0 0
120-160 61 3 0.16 72 11.55
160-200 46 0 0 0 0
200-400 71 2 0.04 102 4.37
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C.1.5 Pedestrian traffic
RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 1000-5000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 8 0 0 0 0
20-40 11 0 0 0 0
40-60 4 0 0 0 0
60-80 3 0 0 0 0
80-100 6 0 0 0 0
100-120 8 0 0 0 0
120-160 9 0 0 0 0
160-200 9 0 0 0 0
200-400 12 1 0.13 0 0
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C.2 Crossings with semiautomatic automatic bar-
rier and without obstacle detector
C.2.1 Automobile traffic
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 13 1 3.51 1 3.51
20-40 93 2 0.32 9 2.88
40-60 87 1 0.10 1 0.10
60-80 99 0 0 0 0
80-100 59 1 0.09 0 0
100-120 83 5 0.25 162.2 40.55
120-160 42 1 0.08 2 0.16
160-200 11 0 0 0 0
200-400 25 2 0.12 30 3.60
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 28 0 0 0 0
20-40 163 4 0.37 39 14.43
40-60 127 8 0.58 18.63 10.81
60-80 179 5 0.18 3.20 0.58
80-100 87 7 0.41 108.71 44.57
100-120 85 4 0.20 29 5.80
120-160 71 5 0.23 35.6 8.19
160-200 41 1 0.06 2 0.12
200-400 41 7 0.26 52.14 13.56
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RTV Automobile traffic volume: 1000-5000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 0 0 0 0 0
20-40 104 4 0.59 2 1.18
40-60 99 5 0.46 4.2 1.93
60-80 123 10 0.53 5.7 3.02
80-100 60 4 0.34 4.25 1.45
100-120 64 6 0.39 37 14.43
120-160 62 6 0.32 18.67 5.97
160-200 35 5 0.36 46.6 16.78
200-400 48 5 0.16 4.40 0.70
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 5000-10000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 7 0 0 0 0
20-40 25 0 0 0 0
40-60 33 0 0 0 0
60-80 28 4 0.93 46.75 43.48
80-100 6 0 0 0 0
100-120 6 2 1.38 8.5 11.73
120-160 7 1 0.47 38 17.71
160-200 5 1 0.51 78 39.57
200-400 8 2 0.38 31 11.78
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C.2.2 Freight truck traffic
RTVE Freight truck traffic volume: 0-50
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 33 0 0 0 0
20-40 133 0 0 0 0
40-60 106 4 0.34 5.25 1.79
60-80 127 1 0.05 0 0
80-100 54 0 0 0 0
100-120 100 1 0.04 4 0.16
120-160 62 4 0.21 41 8.61
160-200 27 1 0.09 10 0.90
200-400 24 0 0 0 0
RTV Freight truck traffic volume: 50-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 5 0 0 0 0
20-40 29 0 0 0 0
40-60 21 2 0.87 1 0.87
60-80 27 1 0.24 1 0.24
80-100 3 0 0 0 0
100-120 11 0 0 0 0
120-160 10 0 0 0 0
160-200 1 0 0 0 0
200-400 6 0 0 0 0
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C.2.3 Motorcycle traffic
RTV Motorcycle traffic volume: 0-50
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 98 3 1.39 39 54.21
20-40 202 3 0.23 70.33 16.18
40-60 75 0 0 0 0
60-80 51 4 0.51 36.25 18.49
80-100 21 1 0.24 107 25.85
100-120 22 1 0.19 1 0.19
120-160 10 0 0 0 0
160-200 0 0 0 0
200-400 1 0 0 0 0
C.2.4 Light vehicle traffic
RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 24 0 0 0 0
20-40 134 0 0 0 0
40-60 145 0 0 0 0
60-80 187 0 0 0 0
80-100 68 0 0 0 0
100-120 123 0 0 0 0
120-160 49 0 0 0 0
160-200 24 0 0 0 0
200-400 29 1 0.05 15 0.75
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RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 32 0 0 0 0
20-40 194 0 0 0 0
40-60 155 1 0.06 6 0.36
60-80 256 3 0.08 38 2.91
80-100 102 2 0.09 3.50 3.48
100-120 115 1 0.04 2 0.08
120-160 99 4 0.13 35 4.61
160-200 60 2 0.09 57 4.82
200-400 59 4 0.10 53.75 5.55
RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 1000-5000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 5 0 0 0 0
20-40 25 1 0.61 1 0.61
40-60 32 0 0 0 0
60-80 26 0 0 0 0
80-100 11 1 0.46 107 49.35
100-120 9 1 0.46 1 0.46
120-160 18 0 0 0 0
160-200 14 0 0 0 0
200-400 40 2 0.08 13.5 1.03
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C.2.5 Pedestrian traffic
RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 14 0 0 0 0
20-40 138 1 0.11 102 11.25
40-60 164 0 0 0 0
60-80 251 0 0 0 0
80-100 117 2 0.09 107.50 9.32
100-120 126 0 0 0 0
120-160 85 1 0.04 4 0.16
160-200 53 2 0.10 103.50 9.91
200-400 85 2 0.04 106.50 3.81
RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 44 0 0 0 0
20-40 233 1 0.07 3 0.21
40-60 188 0 0 0 0
60-80 224 1 0.03 103 2.9-9
80-100 104 1 0.05 103 5.03
100-120 140 0 0 0 0
120-160 111 4 0.12 0.50 0.06
160-200 59 1 0.04 205 8.81
200-400 114 4 0.05 82 4.38
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RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 1000-5000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 13 0 0 0 0
20-40 36 0 0 0 0
40-60 27 0 0 0 0
60-80 21 0 0 0 0
80-100 16 0 0 0 0
100-120 18 0 0 0 0
120-160 19 0 0 0 0
160-200 12 1 0.21 5 1.05
200-400 19 1 0.08 0 0
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C.3 Grade 3 crossings without obstacle detector
C.3.1 Automobile traffic
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 26 1 0.04 16 0.64
20-40 38 0 0 0 0
40-60 27 5 1.69 16.80 28.41
60-80 13 1 0.50 10 5
80-100 3 0 0 0 0
100-120 8 2 1.04 51.50 53.45
120-160 4 0 0 0 0
160-200 0 0 0 0 0
200-400 2 0 0 0 0
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 12 1 3.81 1 3.81
20-40 2 0 0 0 0
40-60 0 0 0 0 0
60-80 0 0 0 0 0
80-100 0 0 0 0 0
100-120 0 0 0 0 0
120-160 0 0 0 0 0
160-200 0 0 0 0 0
200-400 0 0 0 0 0
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RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 0-1100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 48 0 0 0 0
20-40 67 0 0 0 0
40-60 50 1 0.18 3 0.54
60-80 25 0 0 0 0
80-100 6 0 0 0 0
100-120 25 0 0 0 0
120-160 17 0 0 0 0
160-200 9 0 0 0 0
200-400 8 1 0.19 80 15.22
RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 6 0 0 0 0
20-40 8 0 0 0 0
40-60 7 1 1.31 4 5.24
60-80 6 0 0 0 0
80-100 0 0 0 0 0
100-120 4 0 0 0 0
120-160 4 1 0.81 3 2.43
160-200 0 0 0 0 0
200-400 0 0 0 0 0
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C.3.2 Light vehicle traffic
RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 41 0 0 0 0
20-40 60 0 0 0 0
40-60 41 0 0 0 0
60-80 21 0 0 0 0
80-100 13 0 0 0 0
100-120 24 1 0.17 122 21.10
120-160 20 1 0.16 101 16.47
160-200 5 0 0 0 0
200-400 8 0 0 0 0
RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 21 0 0 0 0
20-40 26 1 0.59 106 62.05
40-60 19 3 1.44 37.67 54.31
60-80 12 0 0 0 0
80-100 4 0 0 0 0
100-120 11 0 0 0 0
120-160 9 1 0.36 147 53.27
160-200 8 1 0.32 1 0.32
200-400 7 1 0.22 103 22.40
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C.3.3 Pedestrian traffic
C.4 Grade 4 crossings without obstacle detector
C,4.1 Automobile traffic
RTV Automobile traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 32 0 0 0 0
20-40 70 7 1.52 35.43 53.85
40-60 22 2 0.83 122.50 101.68
60-80 11 0 0 0 0
80-100 3 0 0 0 0
100-120 1 0 0 0 0
120-160 1 0 0 0 0
160-200 0 0 0 0 0
200-400 0 0 0 0 0
C.4.2 Motorcycle traffic
RTV Motorcycle traffic volume: 0-50
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 98 3 1.39 39 54.21
20-40 202 3 0.23 70.33 16.18
40-60 75 0 0 0 0
60-80 51 4 0.51 36.25 18.49
80-100 21 1 0.24 107 25.85
100-120 22 1 0.19 1 0.19
120-160 10 0 0 0 0
160-200 0 0 0 0 0
200-400 1 0 0 0 0
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C.4.3 Light vehicle traffic
RTV Light vehicle traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 108 0 0 0 0
20-40 227 4 0.27 62.75 16.83
40-60 83 1 0.11 118 12.98
60-80 58 0 0 0 0
80-100 26 0 0 0 0
100-120 22 0 0 0 0
120-160 10 0 0 0 0
160-200 2 0 0 0 0
200-400 2 0 0 0 0
C.4.4 Pedestrian traffic
RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 0-100
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 113 0 0 0 0
20-40 288 2 0.11 108 11.42
40-60 115 5 0.40 88.60 35.18
60-80 69 2 0.19 2 0.38
80-100 41 0 0 0 0
100-120 34 0 0 0 0
120-160 16 0 0 0 0
160-200 7 0 0 0 0
200-400 7 0 0 0 0
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RTV Pedestrian traffic volume: 100-1000
#LC #ACC p w Rm
0-20 17 0 0 0 0
20-40 30 2 1.02 54.50 55.32
40-60 16 0 0 0 0
60-80 3 0 0 0 0
80-100 6 1 0.85 105 88.79
100-120 2 0 0 0 0
120-160 6 0 0 0 0
160-200 0 0 0 0 0
200-400 1 1 1.52 101 153.73
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Appendix D
Testing the statistical significance
of various level crossing attributes
This appendix describes tests conducted to determine the statistical significance of
various level crossing attributes. Specifically, three crossing attributes are discussed
below:
1. Visibility of the crossing (as described in Section 3.7.1)
2. Road gradient (as described in Section 3.7.2)
3. Crossings equipped with obstacle detector (as described in Section 3.7.5)
D.1 Framework
The occurrence of accidents at a level crossing can be described by a Bernoulli random
variable X, given as
if accident occurs at crossing i
otherwise
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Xi = 10
Xi 1 with probability p
0 with probability q = (1 - p)
The sum of n independent Bernoulli random variables X 1, X 2 , ... , Xn is a Binomial
random variable with mean np and variance npq. Since our definition of the accident
rate p is the number of accidents per million trains, and on average, p is around 0.5,
the value of q is approximately equal to 1. Thus, the number of accidents follows a
Binomial distribution with mean np and variance np (Here, n refers to the number
of trains going across the crossing and p is the accident rate).
D.2 Visibility of the crossing
The mean accident rate for crossings with less than 20m visibility is 0.705 (per million
trains) and there have been 220 accidents in this category. On the other hand, the
mean accident rate for crossings with greater than 20m visibility is 0.509 (per million
trains) with 707 accidents in this category. For crossings with visibility less than 20m:
Mean = np = 312 x 106 x 0.705 = 220 (D.1)
Variance = a2 = np = 220 (D.2)
=* Deviation = a = V _ 15 (D.3)
For crossings with greater than 20m visibility:
Mean = np = 1389 x 106 x 0.509 = 707 (D.4)
Variance = a2 = np = 707 (D.5)
= Deviation = a = 707 27 (D.6)
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If the accident rate p were 0.705 (instead of 0.509), then np = 979 accidents which is
almost 10r away from 707. This is clearly statistically significant.
D.3 Road gradient
The mean accident rate for crossings with level road gradient is 0.427 (per million
trains) with 206 accidents in this category. The mean accident rate for crossings with
upward or downward gradient is 0.550 (per million trains) with 721 accidents in this
category. For crossings with level road gradient:
Mean = np = 206 (D.7)
Variance = a 2 = np = 206 (D.8)
=- Deviation = a = ?-% 14 (D.9)
For crossings with upward or downward gradient:
Mean = np = 721 (D.10)
Variance = a 2 = np = 721 (D.11)
4= Deviation = a 27 (D.12)
If p were 0.427 (instead of 0.550), then np = 560 accidents which is almost 6a away
from 721, which is statistically significant.
D.4 Crossings equipped with obstacle detectors
The average accident rate for crossings without detectors is 0.428 (per million trains)
with a total of 811 accidents and the mean rate for crossings with detectors is 0.123
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(per million trains) with 116 accidents. For crossings without detectors:
Meanaccidents = np = 811
Variance = a 2 = 811
=> Deviation = a . 28
(D.13)
(D.14)
(D.15)
For crossings with detectors:
Meanaccidents = np = 116
Variance = a 2 = 116
=> Deviation = a 11
(D.16)
(D.17)
(D.18)
If the accident rate p were 0.428 (instead of 0.123), then np = 404 accidents which is
almost 37a away from 116 and is highly statistically significant.
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